Daily Report

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FBIS-EEU-94-018 *27 January 1994*

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Security Conference Discusses NATO Summit

WS2601133294 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Jan 94 p 23

[Report by Wojciech Pomianowski from Berlin: "Foretaste of Membership; Ministers and Experts After NATO Summit"]

[Text] *"Partnership for Peace" is not a substitute for Central and East European countries' membership in NATO—such is the message coming out of a Berlin conference on European security which ended Tuesday [25 January].*

At the invitation of Federal Defense Minister Volker Ruehe of Germany, the conference participants—defense ministers and deputy defense ministers, experts, scientists, and journalists from 14 countries—assessed the results of the recent NATO summit and the "Partnership for Peace" program.

The Berlin meeting had an informal nature but it is regarded by political circles as significant from the standpoint of shaping public opinion. It was the first meeting of this kind after the recent NATO summit and it was important for countries of Central and East Europe—including Poland--because it served the purpose of providing information on positions taken by the individual countries.

The participants at the Berlin meeting unanimously agreed that the outcome of the NATO summit is positive. There were differences of opinion with regard to assessing the role of "Partnership for Peace." Representatives of the countries of East and Central Europe which are making efforts to become NATO members emphasized that the "Partnership" program should be regarded as a step on the way to membership in NATO.

Such a view was aired among others by the Polish Deputy Defense Minister Jerzy Milewski. He said "Partnership for Peace" is a kind of program which should well serve to prepare Poland soon for full NATO membership. But Milewski also stressed that what is also needed is political protection against political dangers which are occurring. Such a protective shield could be provided by the status of associate NATO or Western European Union membership, or at least the function of an observer in NATO's political agencies. A Euro-Atlantic security system is indispensable in the future which would be based on volunteer membership by countries of North America and Europe, including Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic states. Such an alliance should then sign a treaty of cooperation with Russia.

Speaking before Polish journalists, Minister Milewski said that the position he presented was received with quite a bit of support among conference participants. Similar views were expressed—among others—by the Slovak defense minister and the Hungarian deputy minister. A different position was taken by Russia's representative—Sergey Karaganov who is a deputy director at the European Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and an advisor to President Yeltsin. He said widening NATO to cover the area all the way to the Russian border would create the danger of a military, economic, and social isolation of his country for many years to come.

According to Minister Milewski, Germany is currently our most important partner in implementing the goal of European unity and Poland's integration with the European Union and with NATO. Jerzy Milewski talked in Berlin among others to Jorg Schoenbohm—a secretary of state in the Federal Defense Ministry—about bilateral cooperation between the two countries' defense ministries against the context of European processes and the "Partnership for Peace" program.

Assembly Approves Statement on 'Partnership'

AU2601190894 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Today's plenary session of the People's Assembly opened with the approval of the statement on the Partnership for Peace [PFP], which was read by Deputy Petrika Minga in the name of the Foreign Affairs Commission.

After greeting the PFP initiative of the U.S. Government and of President Clinton in person, the statement expresses the unreserved support of the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania toward this initiative, which serves peace and stability in Europe and beyond.

The statements says that Albania manifests its readiness to be a partner to this initiative, with the conviction that our country has the opportunities and will fulfill partnership conditions. With the establishment of democracy, through its government, Albania has requested full membership in NATO, assessing this as its desire and need, but also as a concrete step in contributing to peace in the turbulent Balkan region.

The statement further stresses that we are convinced that the PFP consensus brings us closer to NATO entities and enables our membership in this pact. Knowing its obligations toward this partnership, Albania will always rely on the principles of democracy and the full respect for human rights and freedoms and the law- governed state.

After voting, the statement was approved unanimously by the deputies present. [passage omitted]

Zhulali Meets With Bulgarian Defense Officials

AU2501203294 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] A delegation of the Bulgarian Defense Ministry and the Bulgarian Army General Staff is currently paying an official visit to our country. Defense Minister Safet Zhulali reserved a special reception for Lieutenant General Zakhari Atanasov Iliev, deputy chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff, and Major General Kiril Yordanov Maznev, chief of the economic-military bloc in the Bulgarian Defense Ministry.

After welcoming them and expressing his satisfaction with today's signing of the cooperation program for 1994 between the two Defense Ministries, Mr. Safet Zhulali put forward the need to accomplish the bilateral military agreement step by step and further strengthen the ties and cooperation between our friendly peoples and armies.

He pointed out only Albania's support for the Partnership for Peace plan, and also its active role in achieving the goal of becoming a NATO member. Mr. Zhulali invited the Bulgarian defense minister and the chief of the Bulgarian Army General Staff to visit our country.

Following the application of the agreement signed by the two defense ministers, a ceremony was held at one of the Defense Ministry halls today to sign a military cooperation program for 1994 between the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Albania and the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Bulgaria. On behalf of the Albanian side, the program was signed by the deputy chief of the Army General Staff, Major General Agim Baruti. For the Bulgarian side, it was signed by the deputy chief of the Army General Staff, Lieutenant General Zakhari Atanasov Iliev.

The cooperation program includes the activities of the two Defense Ministries, the exchange of delegations, working groups for the qualification and exchange of experience, activities for cooperation in the field of personnel, mass media, etc.

Zhelev's Popularity To Increase After Speech

AU2601090294 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 24 Jan 94 p 6

[Valentin Stoev's commentary: "President Wins Again"]

[Text] With his 23 January address to the nation the president again threw down the gauntlet to his greatest opponent—the parliament. He accused the parliament of violating the Constitution through its idleness regarding the judicial system structure issue. Thus he added more points to his public rating, according to which he is much more popular than all other politicians.

Will the parliament members take the president's firm recommendation into consideration? Naturally, they will ignore the precise recommendation, but their lethargic legislative activity regarding the judicial system structure issue will stir a bit.

However, as a countermeasure and for the president's edification the parliamentarians will reach a final consensus on the issue of the presidential prerogatives—a forthcoming parliamentary topic on which, with minor exceptions, there is consensus at the National Assembly.

It appears that the president is prepared to sacrifice with a clear conscience a part of his prerogatives in the name of accelerating legislative activity against crime. Naturally, this will not put an end to the presidential-parliamentary skirmish. The more prudent voters will grasp this fact immediately, the others will instinctively do so later. The president's popularity will continue to increase as a result.

On the basis of all this one can conclude that the president wins again.

Military Adviser Accused of 'Treacherous Plots'

AU2501170194 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 22-23 Jan 94 p 3

[Interview with Dimitur Ludzhev, leader of the New Policy Center and member of the National Assembly, by Miroslava Belcheva; place and date not given: "General Stoyan Andreev and 'High-Ranking Figures' of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Are Allegedly Behind the Campaign Against the President, While the General Is Suspected of Forging Documents Issued by Former Defense Minister Ludzhev"]

[Text] (KONTINENT editorial note: According to Dimitur Ludzhev, National Assembly deputy from the New Democracy Alliance and leader of the New Policy Center Party, criminal gangs are planning to control the streets and the underworld to exert pressure, blackmail, and even physical violence against political figures in the near future. Ludzhev claims to have tried to prevent foreign professional killers and illegal armed groups from entering Bulgaria.)

[Belcheva] Mr. Ludzhev, regarding Zhelev's recent decree and letter regarding his Military Office, you and General Stoyan Andreev [Zhelev's former military adviser] exchanged indirect accusations and mutual revelations blaming each other for distracting public attention from the truth. What is the truth from your point of view?

[Ludzhev] General Andreev was dismissed from the Presidency because he engaged in a series of treacherous plots disgracing the president. While I was still defense minister, he tried, using the same methods, to obtain full access to all kinds of information from the Defense Ministry without anyone's authorization. Together with another individual, he even forged the minister's signature in a letter to the German minister of defense, in order to arrange an official trip to Germany for himself, where he was supposed to honor German officers. I have examined the text of Decree No. 269 and the president's letter, and I recognized his handwriting. A year and a half ago, Andreev was striving for the same things. General Stefan Dimitrov justifiably claims that he has not added even a comma. The text, as such, could not incriminate the president.

[Belcheva] Do you believe that President Zhelev deceived the chief of his Military Office?

[Ludzhev] Not as far as the decree and the letter are concerned. Nevertheless, we should ask ourselves who was behind the further developments of the operation. What did General Andreev do at certain cabinet meetings and in other places, with people who were definitely involved with the "Arlin Antonov" case? Some of them reportedly declared that, after the New Year recess, parliament would deal with Dr. Zhelev regarding certain offenses he allegedly committed. I know about Stoyan Andreev's activities and I am convinced that all these actions should be attributed to him. In addition to this, he frequently exploits his connections with the editors of the daily TRUD to propagate his own version of events, with the purpose of discrediting the Presidency.

[Belcheva] If you are right, is Stoyan Andreev acting in order to get revenge or for political reasons?

[Ludzhev] General Andreev has always been a loyal servant of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and of its top circles. Today, the BSP has special reasons for disgracing the president.

[Belcheva] Is there any truth about the rumors that bodyguard companies staffed with wrestlers and policemen, who are supposed to obtain licenses for their activities by March 1994, are being established under the protection of the New Policy Center that you head?

[Ludzhev] We, at the New Policy Center, have never dealt with such matters. It is another question that I was involved in some squabbles of this kind last month, under the circumstances. In the first place, I tried my best to prevent the establishment of so- called voluntary

detachments under the cover of the "Defense" ["Zashtita"] Association. People who are directly involved with "Defense," even some who belong to high ranking official circles, told me that they had been instructed to control the streets and the underworld. I warned Interior Minister Mikhaylov and other influential people about this. The establishment of armed groups duplicating the official security forces had to be prevented. I am asking you, who is profiting from all this? Members of parliament and of the New Policy Center have withdrawn from the association, but the ball seems not to have landed in the right court.

[Belcheva] Where should the ball land, according to you?

[Ludzhev] Ivo Karamanski and the professional gangsters he imported, have long since been fighting against the so-called wrestlers [professional bodyguards] and their companies, which are by no means damaging Bulgaria. The wrestlers' companies, or at least, the best known among them, had the decency not to admit alien armed structures, such as Russians, Iranians, and others, to our country. Such structures did not exist in Bulgaria for some time, fortunately. Nevertheless, along with the establishment of the "Defense" Association and, later, with the emergence of Ivo Karamanski and his group, professional gangsters were imported into our country. Alien structures were involved. Not everyone knows that Ivo Karamanski is closely connected with a certain economic group—namely the First Eastern Petroleum Company—which employs several highly interesting figures. One of them is General Kiril Velichkov, the man who was in charge of special groups, establishing companies abroad, and ghost firms in particular. Khristo Velichkov, the former police chief, whom I dismissed in 1991, is also one of them. Last, but not least, the notorious Lyuben Gotsev, a former minister of internal affairs, is also involved. Numerous, highly experienced individuals, known for their long service in the security and police forces, are among them. They are all connected with highranking BSP circles, especially close to Andrey Lukanov. It is no coincidence that the BSP is particularly hostile to Kosta Bogatsevski [chief secretary at the Internal Affairs Ministry] who foiled certain criminal plots, thus preventing the import of professional gangsters.

Kenan Criticizes DPS 'Cooperation'

AU2101194094 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 19 Jan 94 p 1

[Text] Ankara, 18 January—In cooperation with the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS], Bulgarians want to eliminate the Turkish presence in Bulgaria, Adem Kenan, chairman of the Turkish Democratic Party [TDP], and his first deputy Emin Hamdi claim in an extensive interview given to the Turkish ORTADOGU daily, BTA reports. In addition to the interview, the daily also published an "Open Letter to the State Leadership of the Republic of Bulgaria from the Leadership of the TDP in Bulgaria."

Kenan and Hamdi level criticisms against certain DPS leaders, accusing them of cooperation with the KGB and the Bulgarian special services. At the same time, the leaders of the unregistered TDP show concern for the fate of the Khazar Turks and Muslims living in Georgia. According to them, there is a high likelihood and risk of the Georgians applying "the Bulgarian model of assimilation."

Official Views Nuclear Waste Storage Problem

AU2401125394 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 20 Jan 94 p 18

[Text] The residual fuel from the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant can be processed in Russia if we form a joint enterprise, Power Engineering Committee chief Nikita Shervashidze announced.

"We will propose this to the Russians at the next talks," he explained. Bulgaria can carry out construction work in Russia, in return for which they could accept our waste nuclear fuel at a more acceptable price.

The Russians refused to accept radioactive waste in 1988, since when we have been stockpiling it in a temporary store. According to our contract with the former USSR, they should take back the fuel free of charge as long as we have nuclear plants. They have agreed to accept the fuel at a price of $1,016 per kilogram, which will cost us $22 million per year.

An alternative is to store the waste fuel in special containers near Kozloduy. These containers would cost us $20 million until the year 2000.

So far, the most acceptable offer that we have received for storing the waste in Bulgaria is $60 million, which was offered by the U.S.-French consortium Framatom-Nuclear Pacific.

Ambassador Views Czech-U.S. Relations

AU2601145694 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 25 Jan 94 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Michael Zantovsky, ambassador to the United States, by Jana Smidova; place and date not given: "Czech-U.S. Relations Are Not Encumbered by Serious Problems"]

[Text] Czech Ambassador to the United States Michael Zantovsky returned home in connection with the visit of President Clinton. He remained in Prague longer than the U.S. President and, before his return to the United States, granted LIDOVE NOVINY an interview on Clinton's visit and on relations between the Czech Republic and the United States.

[Smidova] These relations give the impression of being like a staunch friendship between the Czech and the U.S. people. Are there any problems here at all?

[Zantovsky] The only place where there are no contentious issues is heaven. I consider that we are managing, regardless of the change in the U.S. Administration, to maintain an atmosphere of intense friendship to be paramount. This is something of an exception in normal contacts between states. The fact that the preparation of treaties, such as on the taxation agreement, is a matter for discussion is also part of such a close relationship. It falls to diplomacy, however, to allay any differences. Nonetheless, I am unaware of any serious problems in mutual relations.

[Smidova] Some time has already passed since Clinton's visit. What is your assessment, after such a short time, of its significance?

[Zantovsky] The visit was extremely useful for us, according to both our own assessment and the reactions from around the world. The Partnership for Peace plan was at the center of attention, but, apart from this dominant issue, the visit enabled us to gauge U.S. views on the Central European region, the Czech Republic, and U.S. policy toward Russia in the security sphere. It also gave us sufficient opportunity to acquaint the United States with Czech views on the issue. The situation seems different up close than it does from overseas.

The fact that millions of Americans had an opportunity to get to know our capital city and to see the U.S. President in Prague is also not insignificant. This is something that can be put to very good use and that, of course, we will use, whether in the tourism or the investment spheres. The results of Clinton's visit can simply be turned into ready money.

[Smidova] The U.S. President often travels all over the world. In your opinion, was this visit something special, or was it just a routine visit to a small Central European country?

[Zantovsky] It is true that U.S. presidents travel all over the world, but, in President Clinton's case, this was his first visit to Europe and thus, of course, his first mission in the Central European region. This visit more or less dispelled the speculation that U.S. attention is turning away from Europe and that it will be focused on only the Pacific region. This was an important signal and confirmation of the continuing U.S. interest in Europe and in the stability and security of Central Europe.

[Smidova] The Partnership for Peace plan is being assessed in various ways. Some see it as a mere gesture, while others see it as a well-thought-out and forward-looking strategy. What is your personal opinion?

[Zantovsky] It is essential to realize that, since November, when outgoing Defense Secretary Aspin formulated this idea for the first time, its contents have changed considerably. This was also confirmed in Prague by President Clinton—that is, the issue is not whether the Czech Republic and the other countries of Central and East Europe will join NATO, but when and how. And that is per se very important. If, however, anyone imagined that we would be given automatic security guarantees immediately without any effort on our part, the plan will indeed mean very little to him. The Partnership opens the way for specific possibilities that, given our endeavor, will in the foreseeable future—in a few years—actually lead to the structure of the Czech Armed Forces becoming more compatible with that of the NATO armies. This, in turn, will lead to a very intense exchange of personnel, their coordination, and policy planning. And, last but not least, even the guarantee of consultations contained in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty is not insignificant. This is not, of course, a complete security policy. Nevertheless, any potential aggressor has to take into consideration the fact that this element exists. As far as I am concerned, the success of this plan depends primarily on us. After several decades in which we did not have any influence on our own security, no matter what we did, this is an invaluable factor.

[Smidova] A Czech expatriate, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations M. Albright, played a significant role in the Clinton visit. Do you think she kept her fingers crossed more for us than for the other postcommunist countries?

[Zantovsky] It would certainly be naive to think that Mrs. Albright is our man in the U.S. Administration, even though, during Clinton's visit, commentaries were published joking that now, with Karel Kovanda presiding over the Security Council, the Czech Republic is the only country in the world with two representatives on this body. Mrs. Albright is, first of all, a U.S. politician, someone who very assiduously defends White House policy and U.S. interests in general. It is invaluable for us that, in view of her origins, she is acquainted in detail and professionally with the political trends and situation not only in our country, but also throughout postcommunist Europe. Her views may be an asset to the U.S. President and Administration and, thus, also to us. It is not by chance that President Clinton sent her on a trip to

all of the posttotalitarian countries before his visit, although, from a purely bureaucratic point of view, this was not her task. This was an expression of his faith in her knowledge of the region.

[Smidova] In connection with asserting Czech interests in the United States, it is said that the Czech lobby is weak and that it does not have the same influence as the Polish or Hungarian special-interest groups....

[Zantovsky] Reference is often made to this. The situation is, after all, somewhat different from the Polish exiles because the Czechs arrived in several distinct waves. These are people who brought with them an image of their homeland belonging to their own time. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult for them to share the same views on an issue. Despite this, a number of expatriates are very actively helping the Czech Republic, among other things, by supporting its interests in political circles. Above all, I would mention Charles Vanik, the coauthor of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Moreover, the national lobby is not the only or necessarily the most effective force that could act on our behalf in U.S. politics. It is equally important for us that, owing to the influx of U.S. investment in the Czech Republic, there are now a number of businessmen in the United States interested in ensuring that we are successful, that they are successful with us, and that relations between the two countries are the best they can be. These people appeal actively to their congressmen. This is another force on which we can rely.

Christian Democrats Favor NATO Entry

AU2601142494 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 25 Jan 94 p 6

[Article by Christian Democratic Party Spokesman Ondrej Turek: The Czechs and NATO Entry"]

[Text] Some domestic commentators have joined the foreign critics of the approach taken by the Czech Government, which refused all notions of a joint, or at least a coordinated, approach by the Visegrad Four countries to NATO. Terms like "arrogance" and a "mean trick" are flying about, together with appeals for solidarity and warnings that by this attitude we may lose our last allies. Nevertheless, these daring statements are not based on any rational arguments. However, it is precisely rational thinking and a cool head that we most need today in the tumultuous region of Europe, particularly in its Eastern and Central parts.

The stand of the Czech Republic is not a struggle for petty prestige, as one reporter called it, but responsible behavior. If we succumbed to pressures for a close coordination of the approach to NATO with all of the Visegrad countries, we would be making an error. Unfortunately, it is true that we are more likely to become NATO members after we manage to separate ourselves from the irrational vision of a Visegrad self-help association, after no one dares to include the Czech Republic in East Europe, and after we really prove that we are a prosperous, and especially a stable, democratic state. I believe it is better to have as a partner, even if relatively later, the entire Western civilization than, immediately, several unreliable riders en route to the same destination. I am sorry, but Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary have let themselves be pushed into the role of three drowning men who are trying to grasp the coattails of a fourth one. The representatives of the Czech Republic, however, do not belong to those who cannot realize that three drowning men are too much for one rescuer. It must be hoped that the drowning men know how to swim, at least a little.

Someone could object: What about our sense of solidarity? Should we help them, after all? I believe that the notion of solidarity is not at all appropriate in the present situation. How can we help Hungary, Poland, or Slovakia? How else but verbally? I believe that no one wants us to condition our admission into NATO Samaritan-like by a [demand for] the simultaneous admission of all of the other Visegrad partners. That would be an inexcusable gamble with the security of the Republic because such a statement would slow down our admission into NATO. It could even block it completely because who knows what is going to happen in East Europe over the next few years?

Claims have also been made, as another argument for the coordination of the proceeding of the Visegrad Four, that, after the partition of Czechoslovakia, the West does not want to tolerate any further disintegration of the Central European region. I do not understand what the issue is here. In the instance of the partition of Czechoslovakia, it was an execution of the will expressed by the majority of citizens in the 1992 elections, a commendable avoidance of a Yugoslav-type tragedy, and simply an act that is impossible not to respect, one that must be commended.

And the unwillingness to dissolve the Visegrad Four? This fear is again rather irrational and not at all supported by the evidence. Are the Western countries at all interested in maintaining an integral bloc in the Central European region? Could the Polish or the Slovak elections, for instance, or the expected outcome of the elections in Hungary have changed something in their attitude? If so, would the possible interest in keeping the Visegrad countries close together be in or, rather, against the interests of the Czech Republic—that is, against expeditious admission to NATO?

It is interesting that all of the consequential foreign policy makers in the Czech Republic—the president, the prime minister, and the foreign minister—have reached a rare accord regarding the approach to NATO. It shows that, when the going gets tough, when Czech national interests are at stake, the political representatives can unite. The guarantee of the security of the state and, therefore, admission to NATO really is the number-one national interest.

Government Agrees on Administratative Setup

LD2601205394 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 2000 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Excerpt] At its session in the Kolodeje district of Prague today, the Czech Government reached an agreement on general principles of one single document on the concept of the reform of the territorial administrative setup. This was announced by Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus at the end of the session. He added that there was no fundamental dispute among the four coalition parties about the powers of the higher-level territorial administrative entities. The ministers agreed, above all, on powers to be transferred from central bodies to regional bodies and on the principle that regional self-administration bodies would not deprive villages of their current powers. [passage omitted]

President Kovac Continues Visit to Poland

LD2601202394 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Slovak President Michal Kovac is continuing his official visit to Poland. [passage omitted]

This afternoon he had talks with the president of the Polish National Bank and then he met with journalists. Our correspondent Michal Michalcik was present at the news conference:

[Michalcik] [passage omitted] One of the questions was why no Polish-Slovak agreements were signed during this visit. President Kovac admitted that there were plans to sign two agreements. Last Tuesday, however, the Slovak Government neither approved them nor was in a position to approve them: they were still not ready. [passage omitted]

Another question was why [Slovak] Economy Minister Ducky did not come to Warsaw Michal Kovac said on this topic:

[Begin Kovac recording] Naturally, I am upset by the fact that the government has not agreed to Mr. Ducky's participation, but this changes nothing about the importance and the nature of my visit, because whether these agreements are signed during my visit or Prime Minister Pawlak's visit to the Slovak Republic, or on a different occasion, is not so important, in my opinion.

I do not think that there is poor communication with regard to the preparation of the president's foreign visits. It is possible that the prime minister was not properly informed that coordination was taking place between the Foreign Ministry and the president's office—specifically, its foreign policy department. Coordination usually does not take the form of the president and the prime minister meeting the foreign minister and saying: When are we going, where, and how? This is prepared usually by institutions on the basis of various invitations we have received or made. In my opinion, with regard to this visit, coordination was as it should have been. It might not have been good between the Foreign Ministry and the government office—views were not united, or proper information was not released on which agreements would and would not be prepared. [end recording]

One of the questions was, naturally, about Milan Panic's letter. President Kovac said on this topic that this is a gross provocation against Slovakia. He showed journalists a statement the president's office sent to the Slovak press agency, TASR. [passage omitted]

Meciar Addresses Assembly on Kovac Visit

LD2601234494 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2100 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Excerpts] [Announcer] The first day of the 26th session of the Slovak parliament contained a very interesting debate. Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar spoke in the Slovak parliament today [26 January] immediately after the deputies had invited him to explain why Economic and Foreign Affairs Ministers Jan Ducky and Jozef Moravcik did not accompany President Kovac to Poland and why no agreements were signed between Poland and Slovakia.

[Begin Meciar recording] Let me first thank deputy Miklosko for starting a debate on these issues. They are really serious and deserve the attention of the Slovak parliament.

I learned about preparations for a visit by the Slovak president to the Polish Republic on 19 January 1994, from his personal letter. Before that, I had neither information about the trip nor had I put forward any requests with regard to it. Presidential visits are, unfortunately, independent to such an extent that they are not coordinated with the government. The visit to Poland is not the only one with problems. Other trips were the same—for example, the latest visit to Prague.

Allow me read out the president's letter:

Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister:

As you have already been informed, through the mediation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also on the basis of our talks with the highest-ranking Polish representatives, on 25-27 January 1994 I will be on an official visit to Poland, at the invitation of President Walesa. Your official meeting with Prime Minister Pawlak is also being prepared. Both these events and a number of other Slovak-Polish activities that are being planned are very important with regard to the importance of relations between Slovakia and Poland as partners. On this occasion, I would like to ask for your cooperation in organizing my visit.

I would welcome in particular Minister of Economy Ducky, who accompanied me at the talks with President Walesa in Prague, being a member of my official delegation in Poland. In addition to the official program, the Polish side will prepare separate talks for him with his partners—four ministries in the Polish Government. The Polish hosts are preparing a similar program for Environment Minister Zlocha, and I am asking you also to organize his participation.

After the experts' talks that preceded this visit, Poland expects that at least two agreements will be signed, from a whole number of agreements in preparation. It is obvious that other agreements will be signed only during your meeting with Prime Minister Pawlak.

I have been informed that the government, due to its heavy schedule, was unable to discuss the agreement between the Slovak Government and the Polish Government on environmental cooperation. I would welcome it if the government endorsed this agreement at a brief meeting, specially convened for this purpose, to enable Minister Zlocha to sign it in Warsaw.

I have also been informed that the government had some comments on the agreement on cooperation between border regions and that this was the reason it was not endorsed.

As regards the expectations of the Polish side, I would like to ask you if the agreement on the protection of investments or the agreement on the prevention of double taxation, which are not far from completion, could be offered as a substitute. I believe in you, Mr. Prime Minister, that, owing to the pressing circumstances that I have mentioned, you will carry out necessary steps for our joint contribution to the successful implementation of the tasks of Slovak foreign policy.

I thank you in advance for cooperation and understanding.

In the context of that letter, I would like to say that I do not know anything about the results of talks between the Slovak president and Polish President Walesa during the president's visit to Poland or during their visit to Prague. [passage omitted]

Acting on the basis of the letter, I took all of the steps to meet the minister's—pardon me, the president's—request. I asked ministers to brief me about their progress in their tasks. An agreement on environmental cooperation was prepared to be signed, but, in mid-December, the Polish side presented us with a unilateral alternative proposal not previously assessed by the Slovak Government, and we have a lot of objections to it. An agreement on cooperation of border regions was not approved by the government because we are not satisfied with it. Among other things, it did not define, for instance, what is the territory of border regions, and thus, in fact, this term might be applied to the entire territory of one or the other side to the agreement. It also included other serious legal and political mistakes. It is true that the drafting of an agreement on prevention of double taxation and other agreements have considerably progressed, but within the three working days that were available to us, it was not possible to correct things and finalize the drafts without consultations with the Polish side.

On the basis of these facts, I sent the following letter to the president on 24 January 1994:

Esteemed Mr. President:

The Government of the Slovak Republic is determined to give you all-around support in order to make all of your foreign trips properly prepared and successful.

Together with Ivan Gasparovic, the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, we have already been pointing out for some time now that you need to coordinate your foreign trips, including the entourage, if you are interested in being accompanied by members of the government. A foreign working trip by a member of the government has to be approved by the Slovak Government. Without such an approval, he cannot leave the country.

Next time, plan your matters more in advance. The government should be informed about them in time if agreements between the governments, for the drafting of which the government of the Slovak Republic is responsible, are to be signed.

During my visit to Prague, a meeting between the prime ministers of the Slovak Republic and the Polish Republic took place. At the meeting, Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak asked for a meeting between the members of the Slovak and Polish Governments to take place not in January 1994 but later. We agreed on this. The course of action you took contradicts this agreement between the prime ministers of the Slovak Republic and the Polish Republic.

Despite the above-mentioned, the Slovak Government approved a visit by Environment Minister Jozef Zlocha to Poland. However, the agreement will still be subject to discussion as in December, new amendments were sent by the Polish side to the already discussed agreement, and we have not yet taken them into account. As far as other agreements you propose for signing during your visit to Poland are concerned, though their drafting has progressed a great deal, they are not yet ready for approval and signing.

I am making an urgent appeal for improving cooperation with the Slovak Government. I leave it to you to reconsider whether in this situation you insist that Environment Minister Zlocha is among the members of your entourage, taking into account also a stance by the Polish prime minister. Economy Minister Jan Ducky's trip was not approved by the government, and this is why he will not take part in the trip to Poland.

Yours respectfully,

[signed] Meciar [passage omitted]

During talks in Prague, the Polish prime minister turned to the Slovak Government delegation with a plea, explaining that he has such pressing duties in his country that he does not consider any meeting between the members of the government of the two sides in January to be suitable. We agreed only on a meeting between his adviser and the Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Prokes on the territory of the Slovak Republic. As the proposal for a meeting was made by the Slovak side with great urgency, the Polish side agreed to hold an informal one-day meeting between government members, probably in the Tatras mountains, to discuss cooperation questions. [passage omitted]

The course of action chosen by the President's Office is not a usual one, but we are not entitled to express our view on it or to control it. This is a matter for you, the National Council of the Slovak Republic.

It is up to you to assess what has happened. The government has done all it should have and could have done in the given situation to assure the success of the president's foreign trip. [passage omitted]

As I have already taken the floor, and, as there are various pieces of information voiced by the media and in public, allow me to brief you about yet another thing, not because it involves me but because that action or its content are aimed at grossly damaging the interests of the Slovak Republic and its policy, as well as the Government of the Slovak Republic. [passage omitted]

I assess the letter [allegedly sent by Yugoslav former Prime Minister Milan Panic] to be one of a number of provocations aimed partly against me, which is not important, and against the Slovak Republic. [passage omitted]

This is a matter concerning the state. Following an attempt to subvert our state or its economy by forging a large number of stamped [Czechoslovak] bank notes, this is yet another one of a big number of provocations constantly being carried out against Slovakia.

As far as insults against me are concerned, I have forgiven the past ones—as you sitting on the right at the back benches well know, and I will also forgive these. I only regret that hate toward me has led toward acts against the interests of our state, toward acts damaging them. [passage omitted]

To put our state in danger of having to face international isolation, international sanctions for not complying with the embargo, I am afraid I cannot find a polite expression to describe this. [passage omitted]

I want to say that our state has been internationally recognized but provocations against it took place, are taking place, and will continue to take place. As regards all those who are in a state of euphoria that we have already overcome all problems, I would like to draw their attention to the fact that we have not yet overcome anything. Nothing has been solved, nothing has been completed. Either we will unite behind our aims, fighting for them and protecting them together, or these purposeful provocations—and others about which we have at present received some preliminary intelligence information that they might be in the process of being prepared—can bring about the situations that will be substantially more complicated and more difficult.

Therefore, consider your every step, your every statement and political stance! Much is still ahead of us, and it will not be the last thing we have to overcome.

Thank you for your attention. [applause] [passage omitted] [end recording]

Daily Publishes Komarno Assembly Documents

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[Complete text of the documents adopted by the Association of Towns and Communities of Zitny Island at its assembly in Komarno on 8 January: "The Points of View Adopted by the Association of Towns and Communities of Zitny Island"]

[Text] The assembly held in Komarno on 8 January 1994 attended by local self-administration deputies, town and village mayors, and parliamentary deputies from South Slovakia adopted a series of documents, which we are publishing in full. Above all, we think that their relevance also depends on their sponsors' obligation not to stray from the bounds defined in them in the future.

A General Point of View (Introduction)

The members of the local self-administrations, town and village mayors, and parliamentary deputies—the elected representatives of Hungarians in Slovakia—publish the following point of view from their assembly in Komarno on 8 January 1994:

Following the political changes after November 1989, Hungarians in Slovakia manifested their support for political pluralism, parliamentary democracy, and the execution of the principle of self-administration in two parliamentary elections and in the elections to local representative bodies.

The Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement-Egyutteles coalition currently has 14 deputies in the National Council of the Slovak Republic. These movements highlighted as a priority task in their election programs improving the legal status of Hungarians in Slovakia. There are 5,000 Hungarian deputies and roughly 400 Hungarian mayors in town and community self-administrations.

According to the 1991 census, more than 600,000 inhabitants with Hungarian as their mother tongue live in Slovakia—that is, 11.5 percent of the total population. Members of the Hungarian community make up the majority in 437 towns and villages and account for 10-50 percent of the population in another 85 towns and villages. These 522 towns and villages are located in a continuous—compact—territory along the southern border of the Slovak Republic. Almost 98 percent of the Hungarians in Slovakia live on this territory and account for almost 70 percent of the population here. Apart from this, there is a sizable number—1,000-20,000—of Hungarians in another four cities.

The sociological surveys that have been carried out regularly since October 1990 indicate that a high percentage of the Hungarian population in the Slovak Republic supports parliamentary democracy. Compared with the rest of the population, xenophobia and anti-Semitism are less characteristic among the Hungarians, and they also display the greatest tolerance toward other

people. The attitude of Hungarians toward Slovaks is positive, and the sociological surveys show that the Slovaks who live among them feel the same.

The participants in the assembly want in the future to enhance the community of Hungarians in Slovakia, and also the territories where Hungarians and Slovaks live together, on these foundations. The participants in the assembly realize that the basis for social peace, development, and human affluence is a peaceful relationship, regulated by law, between members of different nationalities. This is a prerequisite for ensuring that structural changes in policy and the economy take place as quickly as possible in Central Europe and that the countries of this region can integrate themselves into the European Union.

Following the collapse of the communist system, the citizens and governments of the former communist states, as well as the whole of Europe, face new tasks: creating a new system for security and stability in Europe that would make it possible to forestall local and regional conflicts and also creating the basic prerequisites for expanding European integration toward the former communist countries.

The Central European region is, among other things, characterized by biased attitudes and pent-up tension that could result in tragic conflicts. We will do all we can to ensure that such a conflict does not break out in the Carpathian basin. However, it is necessary to point out that it is also essential to deal with the ethnic problems here.

In Slovakia, which gained its independence in 1993, this means that it is necessary to establish relations between Slovaks and Hungarians on new foundations. In the interest of this, it is necessary to create a new system for relations between Slovaks and Hungarians and to adopt new laws. The measures adopted by the government so far have contributed to worsening mutual relations. The new system of relations should strengthen the basic pillars of democracy: the system of self-administrations, a law-governed state, and a constitutional-legal status for the ethnic communities.

The participants in the assembly therefore express their point of view on three fundamental issues.

The Constitutional and Legal Status of Hungarians

The participants in the assembly assert that the Hungarian population in Slovakia, despite some repression and pressure under the totalitarian regime and after World War II and other attempts to ethnically homogenize the population, has maintained its ability to express again its political subjectivity, to organize its community, and to preserve the original settlement structure on the territories where it has lived for thousands of years as an autochthonous community and, in most cases, has also formed the majority of the local population. Proceeding from this, the Hungarian population in Slovakia defines itself as a national community resolved to struggle to ensure that, apart from the individual rights that should pertain to everyone, its community rights are recognized and that its status as a community is enshrined in the Constitution.

At the same time, they proceed from the UN resolution according to which the right of individuals and collectives to preserve their own identity is one of the basic human rights. Their conviction that political and cultural self-identification and self-determination within the framework of the state is a basic right of the Hungarian national community is inherent in this.

The participants in the assembly proclaim the following: For the development of the ethnic Hungarian community in Slovakia, it is essential that: —In places where Hungarians account for at least 10 percent of the population, they can use their mother tongue, orally and in writing, in contacts with state bodies or, as the case may be, in public administration and have a right to the designation of public areas and to public information in Hungarian.

—In places where Hungarians make up the majority of the population, Hungarian is the official language alongside Slovak.

—The Slovak Republic signs and ratifies the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages.

—The representation of Hungarians in state bodies and public institutions corresponds to their number.

—The Hungarian community receives a fair allocation from the state budget or, alternatively, from the budget for self-administrations in accordance with its size.

The participants in the assembly proclaim that Hungarians in Slovakia, proceeding from the principle of civic equality:

—Want to establish the Slovak Republic along with the Slovak people as an equal community.

—Want, in accordance with the draft constitutional law prepared by deputies from the Hungarian coalition, to express their political subjectivity via their own representative bodies that will evolve from democratic elections.

—Demand, in the interest of maintaining their own identity, the recognition of a special legal status for the territory where a considerable number of Hungarians live.

The participants in the assembly express their conviction that one of the fundamental elements of equality is thorough adherence to the principle of mutuality. This means that, in regions, towns, or communities in which members of one nationality or inhabitants with the same mother tongue are in the minority, they have a legally guaranteed right to an education in their mother tongue, a right to use their mother tongue, and the right to

acquire and disseminate information in their mother tongue. As far as these rights are concerned, the given community should have the right of agreement in relation to the regional self-administration and the state administration. This means that it should not be possible to make a decision on these issues without the agreement of this community.

The participants in the assembly proclaim that implementing these principles within the Slovak Republic, an equivalent status for the Hungarian national community and the Slovak nation with respect to its state-forming capacity and the application of rights serves to bolster the statehood and territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic and to create a democratic law-governed state.

The Jurisdiction of the Self-Administrations

The participants in the assembly realize that one of the basic pillars of a law-governed state is a system of self-administrations equipped with broad powers; this is a framework in which citizens have an opportunity to democratically express their will and to oversee the implementation of their interests and respect for human rights and freedoms.

The participants in the assembly state that the rights of the self-administrations in the Slovak Republic are inadequate. The development of the self-administrations comes up against obstacles, their rights are deliberately curtailed, central power is being increased to the detriment of the self-administrations, and the bodies of the state administration are being given superiority over them. The chapter in the Slovak Constitution on territorial self-administrations (Articles 64-71) contains only general statements. These principles may thus manifest themselves in a completely distorted manner both in laws and in practice.

The participants in the assembly consider it essential that the powers of the self-administrations be unequivocally defined by law—that is, that a territorial system be created within whose framework a self-administration's bodies will run their affairs by utilizing the predominant part of the taxes according to the values produced on the given territory and will guarantee the democratic self-regulation and self-administration of the local population.

In the interest of this:

1. The Slovak Republic should sign as soon as possible the agreement on affiliation to the European Charter on Local Self- Administrations. The basic ideas behind it are as follows: increasing democracy, decentralizing power, subsidiarity, and the sworn and public acceptance of undertakings by the contracting parties.

2. The declaration on affiliation to the European Charter on Local Self-Administrations should contain at least 20 points from Article 12, among which should feature the following—to us—important points:

—Article 2, enshrining the rights of the local self-administrations in the Constitution and laws.

—Article 3, Paragraph 1, dealing with the overwhelming majority of public issues at a local level.

—Article 4, Paragraph 3, the body that is territorially closest to the citizen should be responsible for dealing with public matters.

—Article 4, Paragraph 4, complete and exclusive authority for the local bodies.

—Article 5, the unchangeability of the self-administration's borders without the agreement of the population.

—Article 8, Paragraph 1, supervision of the activity of self-administrations should be regulated by law.

—Article 9, Paragraph 2, the appropriate financial cover for their activity in harmony with their powers.

—Article 10, Paragraph 1, the right of the self-administrations to form associations.

—Article 10, Paragraph 2, the right of the self-administrations to join international associations.

—Article 11, protection of the free execution of rights should be guaranteed by the courts.

3. In the interest of legal certitude, the following should be itemized in the Constitution: the system of self-administrations, their jurisdiction and authority, or, alternatively, their unalterability by means of other legal norms.

4. The following should be expressed in the Constitution in detail: the system of self-administrations, their jurisdiction and authority.

5. Before the implementation of the new system for the country's territorial-administrative division, it is necessary to create, in accordance with Chapter 2, Article 64 of the Slovak Republic Constitution, larger territorial units, on the basis of a voluntary association of self-administrations, that will come under the jurisdiction of the future territorial self-administrations. At the same time, it is necessary to respect Council of Europe recommendation No. 1201.

6. In harmony with Chapter 3, Article 4 of the European Charter on Local Self-Administrations, it is necessary to constitutionally outline the complete and exclusive powers of the self-administrations. Thus, it is necessary to guarantee that these powers cannot be curbed by regulations from central or regional bodies.

7. In the interest of decentralizing power, rationalizing the state administration, and increasing responsibility beneficial to the public by transferring power from state administration bodies to the self-administrations, it is necessary to bring administration closer to the citizen

and to expand the constitutional authority of the self-administrations, especially in the spheres of education, culture, health care, public safety, and the environment.

8. It is also necessary to coordinate the material, economic, and financial conditions necessary for the self-administrations' functioning with the powers and responsibility of the self-administrations. All of the property and real estate located in the community should be ceded to the local self-administration in cases where the owner is not known.

From the point of view of establishing a democratic legal order, legal certitude, and a law-governed state, we consider it expedient—respectively, executable and necessary in the interest of stability—for the National Council to adopt laws on the self-administrations with a three-fifths majority. In the case of the self-administrations of the (ethnic) minorities, they should be guaranteed the right to veto the execution of rulings that are disadvantageous to them, since so-called numerical democracy, by its very essence, cannot guarantee the widespread execution of the interests of those in the minority.

The Administrative Reorganization of Slovakia

The assembly participants take the following as their point of departure:

—The state forms the framework for the realization and protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

—The territorial and administrative arrangement in the country should be based on an integral system of the execution of public administration, and the most important elements of the arrangement are the following: a decentralized state administration, economy of the administration, and service to the principal interests of the citizens.

The assembly participants believe that the present system of public administration in the Slovak Republic conforms to neither the European requirements nor the requirements of the local population because it is uneconomical and heavy-handed, with an overgrown bureaucracy; the decisionmaking process is very complicated; and its powers are not clearly defined. The distribution of power among the bodies of the state administration and the local self-governing administrations is not rational. The system of territorially integrated state administration authorities with definite powers conflicts with local interests. The government has been planning a reorganization of the public administration system since 1990. Attempts at decentralization were initially made within the framework of this plan. Today, however, the centralization tendencies, which serve the interests of the central power, are again gaining in prominence.

The assembly participants declare the following:

1. The proposal made by the government does not suit most local self-governing administrations in Slovakia. For the Hungarian community, this plan is unacceptable, in addition to the general objections, because the region inhabited by the Hungarian community would be divided into five administrative sections, and that would result in a complete marginality of the Hungarians, which in turn would render a solution to the actual problems impossible. This would facilitate organized assimilation.

2. When constituting administrative regions and bodies of state administration in the country, it is necessary to build on the principle of legal security guarantees and a two-tier system of public administration.

3. The new public administration structure must be formed, while respecting the principle that public affairs should be managed by a body that is territorially closest to the citizens. In present-day Slovakia, this means that, in addition to the self-governing administrations, the first tier of the state administration should be constituted on the territory of the already existing (or similar) domains of the state administration. The first tier of the state administration should receive all such administrative powers as needed to deal with all official business in the given region, including the transfer of powers from the present authorities with specific powers. Concurrently, it is necessary to close down the present district offices of the state administration.

4. When creating the second tier of the administrative regions and bodies of the state administration, it is necessary to build on the principle that they are to be constituted within the framework of the territorial units that arose by a voluntary integration of the (local) self-governing administrations.

5. The reorganization of the territorial arrangement and the state administration should respect the fundamental interests of the Hungarian national community:

—That its region of habitation is not divided among several constitutional units, in which the Hungarian community would become a marginal minority, without any chance of promoting its interests, and would not have the opportunity to participate in dealing with matters that concern it.

—Such a constitutional arrangement is acceptable for the Hungarian national community, as long as it does not assume the position of a minority (in terms of strength) in the territories on which many of its members live.

—That Article 11 of Recommendation No. 1201 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council be observed in the territorial and administrative reorganization, according to which:

In the areas where the members of ethnic minorities live in significant numbers, they have the right to special a legal status or to local or autonomous bodies of public

administration, which correspond to the historical and local specific features of the given community and are in harmony with the legislation of the given state.

The legitimacy of these demands is confirmed by the following data:

According to the 1991 census, the cities and villages populated by members of the Hungarian national community in Slovakia can be put into three categories:

a) Majority regions: cities and villages in which Hungarians form at least 50 percent of the population. There are 432 cities and villages with 437,727 inhabitants of Hungarian nationality in this category.

b) Minority regions: cities and villages in which the share of Hungarians is over 10 percent but less than 50 percent. There are 90 cities and villages (the Hungarians live in a relative majority in five of them) in this category, with 83,125 inhabitants of Hungarian nationality .

c) Regions in which Hungarians live dispersed: cities and villages in which the share of Hungarians does not reach 10 percent but their absolute number exceeds 100 people. There are 28 cities and villages (the number of Hungarians is 39,519) in this category, while, in four cities (Bratislava, Kosice, Nitra, Velky Krtis), 1,000-20,000 Hungarians live.

The assembly participants propose the following:

1. The second-tier public administration should conform to the territorial entities that emerge from the voluntary association of the cities and villages of categories a) and b) (majority and minority regions).

We believe that there are two feasible solutions:

a) To form one homogeneous territorial administrative entity—region: from the territory below Bratislava as far as Kosice, and then, after a short interruption, southern Zemplin and the area between Uh and Latorica (Medzibodrozie). There are 511 cities and villages in this area with a population of 824,946, of which 507,073 are Hungarians (61.46 percent).

b) To form three administrative entities—regions: from Bratislava to Sahy: population of 526,620, of which 331,704 are inhabitants of Hungarian nationality (66.11 percent), 250 cities and villages—southern Zemplin and the area between Uh and Latorica: population of 58,985, of which 45,576 are inhabitants of Hungarian nationality (77.27 percent), 53 cities and villages.

The Hungarian linguistic island below Nitra should form a special territory (first tier administrative region) formed of 18 communities with the Hungarian population 12,895 (51 percent of the total) strong.

2. At the offices within the framework of the first- and second-tier administrative units with special powers, formed according to the aforementioned principle, the law should guarantee the possibility of dealing with official matters in both languages orally or in writing.

3. From the vantage point of the authority and powers, the system of institutions in the framework of the territorial and administrative entities should be compatible throughout Slovakia. The territories inhabited by Hungarians or by members of other national minorities, however, should form an exception and have special legal status.

The assembly participants consider it necessary that the aforementioned principles and views be implemented in the territorial and administrative reorganization of the country. It would contribute to the reinforcement of the inner stability and social peace.

The Possibilities for the Economic Development of the Self-Administrative Regions

The structural changes in the economy and the transition to a market economy have highlighted the economic differences between the individual regions. During the past four years, some regions have found themselves in a severe economic crisis and have major problems with unemployment.

The area of South Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians is also among these regions. The unemployment level here far exceeds the nationwide average and, what is more, districts with a Hungarian population are among the areas with the highest level of unemployment.

According to the official figures, the level of unemployment in Slovakia on 31 October 1993 was 13.8 percent. However, on the same date, the unemployment level in the Dunajska Streda District was 20.1 percent. It was 19.2 percent in Galanta; 21.0 percent in the Komarno District; 20.8 percent in Kosice-Environs; 15.5 percent in the Levice District; 19.0 percent in the Lucenec District; 17.5 percent in the Nove Zamky District; 23.7 percent in the Rimavska Sobota District; 21.3 percent in the Roznava District; 19.0 percent in the Trebisov District; and 19.8 percent in the Velky Krtis District.

One of the main reasons for the economic problems in territories with a Hungarian population is the one-track branch-by-branch structure [jednostranna odvetvova struktura]. The economy of this territory is determined by agriculture and by the services linked to it, to a degree, by the food industry; all of these are considered to be crisis branches. The one-track branch-by-branch structure of the economy in these territories is the result of Czech economic policy during the First Republic. In addition to this, in the 1950's—at the beginning of Slovakia's industrialization—only rarely were industrial enterprises founded on these territories and, from the ecological point of view, the new plants mostly had an negative impact. Plants such as, for example, the Duslo chemical plant in Sala, the paper plant in Sturovo, the nuclear power plant in Mochovce, the hydroelectricity plant in Gabcikovo, or the heating plant in Vojany.

Responsibility for the economic stagnation or, rather, the economic decline on these territories is borne by the Czechoslovak state and the Slovak political leadership. To rectify these mistakes, it is necessary for these regions to become regions with an independent administration. In this way, their population will finally have an opportunity to control the economic development of their own region in accordance with their own economic policy, and, at the same time, they will also be responsible for it.

Autonomy for the self-administrative regions is relative; it may exist within broad limits: from a formal self-administration to a factual self-administration, which means the possibility of independent decisionmaking in important issues affecting life within the given region. Of course, the aim is to achieve factual autonomy—that is, self-administrations in the broadest sense of the word, self-administrations in which there are great opportunities to develop the economy, politics, culture, education, and ecology on the territory of the given region.

It is necessary to emphasize: If, on the territories with a predominantly Hungarian population, we demand the creation of regions with their own self-administration, this does not mean that we would want to isolate ourselves from the Slovak economy. What we intend by the better utilization of what we have and the comparative advantages of the individual regions is to strengthen the national economy of the whole of Slovakia.

From the economic point of view, the creation of these regions is important because it makes it possible:

—To draft and implement regional programs and concepts for economic development that accept and utilize the comparative advantages of the individual regions and lead to the elimination of the current one-track branch-by-branch structure.

—To attract foreign capital and organize foreign development programs.

—To sign agreements on regional cooperation with regions in the country and outside it.

—To introduce regional and local taxes as a backup for that apportionment of state taxes it is possible to utilize for regional development.

—To utilize financial sources (funds) provided from the state budget for the development of the given region.

It is particularly necessary to mention the institutional possibilities for regional economic development. These are:

—Regional chambers of trade and industry.

—Regional specialist associations.

—Regional banks and insurance companies.

—Regional institutions for economic development (offices, agencies).

Regional economic development can only be successful if we understand that this is a long-term process and we approach it accordingly, if we implement it with commitment, if the organizers are personally interested in it, if it is based on discovering and using the internal potential and comparative advantages of the regions, and if the development strategy is adapted systematically to potential and needs.

An organic element of the political and economic changes at the moment is the redivision of Slovakia into administrative and self-administrative units. In the new territorial division, it is unnecessary to proceed in accordance with the principle of divide et impera, but it is necessary to create viable units so that the whole—the country—is also enhanced. This aim may be achieved by creating regions while taking into consideration historical traditions, natural regional units, and economic potential so that the energy of sound local patriotism, the cohesive strength of the inhabitants of the given region, and their endeavor for self-realization, their instinct to establish their right to existence, and their desire to achieve success are all utilized.

Foreign Ministry Statement on Minority Policy

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[Article by editor Agata Stanekova on the regular briefing at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

[Text] Mrs. Daniela Rozgonova briefed us today on the following statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it natural and understandable that Hungarian political circles and the general public follow with interest political and social developments in the neighboring Slovak Republic. It has, however, met with less understanding when the information of the governmental Office for the Hungarian National Minorities Abroad misinterprets a resolution of the Slovak parliament—the parliament of a neighboring country—on the basis of which doubts could be cast about whether the Slovak Republic really wants to observe the pledges it adopted when joining the Council of Europe.

In this statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again informs its partners, including the government bodies of the Hungarian Republic, that the Slovak Republic will gradually fulfill all of the pledges it took in connection with joining the Council of Europe. As is known, the implementation of these pledges is being assessed by the Council of Europe. At the same time, the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejects any general and unsubstantiated accusations that the Slovak Republic is not observing the obligations following from the CSCE documents.

Journalists also wanted to know why Minister Moravcik did not take part in the Slovak delegation's visit to

Poland. This was agreed with the Polish partner due to the fact that the Polish foreign minister was on a visit to the United States. The two foreign ministers are to meet at a different date.

In connection with the alleged letter from [former FRY Prime Minister] Milan Panic to Prime Minister Meciar, the representatives of the Foreign Ministry confirmed the statement by Jozef Moravcik yesterday. They said that, in connection with the possible export of weapons, the ministry is publishing its view on the aspects of this with regard to international law and that no export can take place without a decision by the ministry.

Commentaries View Sovereignty Over South

AU2601145594

[Editorial Report] Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 25 January publishes three commentaries in reaction to statements by Sandor Lezsak, executive chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], about the situation of the Hungarian minority, made during his recent three-day visit to Slovakia, held at the invitation of the Hungarian minority's Coexistence Movement.

Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 25 January on page 3 carries a 450-word Dominik Hurny commentary entitled "Boundless Ruthlessness." The commentary takes issue with Lezsak's statement that, "as long as the basic rights of citizens of Hungarian nationality in Slovakia are not guaranteed, it is impossible to speak about a Hungarian-Slovak settlement—that is, about the signing of an interstate treaty." Hurny asks: "What basic rights do the Hungarian citizens of Slovakia not have? Do they have no schools and periodicals, are they forbidden to speak Hungarian, do they not have their own radio and television broadcasts and bilingual names of streets and shops? What are they being denied—church services in Hungarian, the use of Hungarian in dealings with the authorities in southern Slovakia? What is being denied to them in comparison with Hungary and its minorities? Who gave Mr. Lezsak the right to declare in Slovakia that Hungarian citizens in Slovakia do not have basic rights?" After denouncing Lezsak's assertions as a "lie" and "boundless ruthlessness," the commentator goes on to challenge "Messrs. Duray, Bugar, and Nagy," the leaders of the Hungarian parties in Slovakia, "to state in public which basic rights the Hungarian population of Slovakia does not have and in which areas Hungarian legislation and, above all, the Hungarian practice vis-a-vis the Slovak and other minorities is better and of a higher standard than is the case in Slovakia." He says: "It is necessary to ask Messrs. Duray, Bugar, and Nagy to furnish evidence for their propaganda attacks, which run counter to reality. We know very well who in southern Slovakia is threatened with assimilation! As long as Mr. Duray and company do not try to specify their attacks, any further talks are superfluous. The government must demand from these muckrakers a clear answer to the question of their alleged basic rights. There can be no talk of a dialogue until then."

On the same page, REPUBLIKA carries a 600-word Eva Zelenayova commentary entitled "And Who Will Protect the Citizen?" Commenting on the MDF delegation's visit to southern Slovakia, Zelenayova says: "During the delegation's first stop, at Kralovsky Chlmec, Stefan Pasztor, the mayor of that city, let himself be heard that Hungarians in Medzibodrozi [area between the Uh and Latorica Rivers in east Slovakia] are not free and that the government does not take care of them, which is why they have to help themselves. The guests from Hungary, in turn, stated that they are fulfilling their electoral program, which includes taking care of Hungarians beyond the borders of the Hungarian Republic. At his news conference on Sunday [23 January], MDF Executive Chairman Sandor Lezsak went so far as to term the Komarno rally [of 8 January, at which Hungarian minority representatives formulated their demands] the beginning of efforts at a Slovak-Hungarian settlement, which, however, is still a long way off, in his opinion, because the basic human rights of the Hungarian minority are not guaranteed in the Slovak Republic.... We could scarcely find a state in Europe that would let its sovereignty be jeopardized the way we allow our southern neighbors to do this. They are not alone, receiving substantial help from their notoriously known lackeys in our own country. By their statements and initiatives, they jeopardize and offend with impunity the state and its population. Meanwhile, the General Prosecutor's Office is silent, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not sent a single protest note yet. Quite the contrary, we are being generous and assume an accommodating stand, imprudently and to our own detriment." In concluding, Zelenayova calls on the government "to act as the government of a sovereign state so that the citizen will not have to fear about who will protect him."

On the same day, on page 1, REPUBLIKA carries a 400-word editorial by Roman Kalisky entitled "Public Matter." According to the author, telephones had been ringing in the REPUBLIKA editorial office "since yesterday morning," with "indignant readers" asking how it is possible that "a foreign politician can present ultimatums," speaking about the impossibility of a Hungarian-Slovak reconciliation "as long as the basic rights of the Hungarian minority are not recognized in Slovakia," and accuse Slovak representatives of trying to "provoke Hungarians living in Slovakia." Kalisky continues: "What could I tell them? I advised them: Phone the Slovak Government, the minister of interior, the General Prosecutor's Office! Because I know that they are not going to phone them, let me tell these institutions on the callers' behalf:

"Esteemed gentlemen, governmental and nongovernmental Slovak politicians!

"In every sovereign state from Albania to the United States, from New Zealand to Zaire, a foreign state representative such as Sandor Lezak [Slovak spelling of

Lezsak's name used] would get in his passport the 'persona non grata' stamp. And the matter would be settled!

"Second, every citizen of the Slovak Republic who flagrantly establishes contact with the representative of a foreign power with the aim of subverting this Republic should be made criminally liable!" In this context, Kalisky reiterates his earlier call for the adoption of a "law on the protection of the Republic" to be applied against "conspiratorial criminal acts directed against the state, such as are being publicly committed against the Slovak Republic today."

Lezsak's visit to Slovakia is also the subject of a statement made by Docent Jan Cuper from the Theory of State and Law Department of Comenius University's Law School to the Slovak news agency TA SR, which is published by Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 25 January on page 2. The TA SR report on Cuper's statement includes the following passage: "Referring to Sandor Lezsak's tour of southern Slovakia, Jan Cuper said that the naivete of the Slovak state power is being quietly abused in this way in order to prove that Budapest has sovereignty over southern Slovakia. It is no coincidence that the tour did not start in Komarno this time but, rather, in Kralovsky Chlmec in the east, Jan Cuper said, adding that 'if you are not acting like a sovereign subject, you will not be treated like a sovereign subject. It is not customary for someone who is not yet the winner to set preliminary conditions for someone who has not yet been defeated and to blackmail him.' According to Jan Cuper, the developments are aimed at the Hungarian minority being granted autonomy rights, so as to make possible the establishment of Hungarian state power in southern Slovakia."

Radio Chief Complains About 'State Interference'

AU2601161494

[Editorial Report] Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 25 January on page 11 carries a 1,200-word interview with Vladimir Stefko, director of Slovak Radio, by Valeria Koszoruova entitled "Disobedient Radio?" In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Stefko blames the government's interference in Slovak Radio's commercial activities for the institution's difficult economic situation.

In his initial reply, Stefko discusses Slovak Radio's past efforts to reduce its dependence on the state budget by developing its own commercial activities. In this context, he says: "In 1992, for example, Slovak Radio's economic result was 41.5 million korunas better than projected. Last year, the situation changed dramatically for the worse, owing mainly to state interference. The state reduced the majority of Slovak Radio's commercial activities. At the same time, it halted the state subsidy, in contravention of National Council of the Slovak Republic Law Number 14. This was done by the same bodies that in December 1991 called on Slovak Radio to step up its commercial activities in order to ease the burden on the state budget and that promised us the retention of the improved economic result (that is, 41.5 million korunas) to cover parts of the budget that the state was unable to fund. Slovak Radio was deprived of about 80 million korunas in this way, and, in 1993, for the first time in its history, it ended the year with debts. The bulk of them are owed to Slovak Telecommunications, of which Slovak Radio is one of the main customers."

Whereas, in the past, Slovak Radio had three different sources of revenue, Stefko says—subscription fees, state subsidies, and income from commercial activities—now it must make do with subscription fees, which are constantly declining. In this context, he notes that, even though there are 1.9 million households with at least one radio set in Slovakia, according to official statistics, Slovak Radio receives fees from only 1,000,016 subscribers. Stefko attributes the decline to the deteriorating social situation of households and to loopholes in the legislation, which do not make it possible to track down and fine nonpayers.

Citing a specific example of "interference" in Slovak Radio's commercial activities, Stefko mentions the decision of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications to ban broadcasts by the Austrian-owned Radio CD International from Slovak territory. According to Stefko, the cooperation agreement with the Austrian partner guaranteed Slovak Radio an annual income of 52 million Slovak korunas. He points out that "depriving Slovak Radio of money" was the sole aim of this ban, which, he says, "also met with a very negative response on the Austrian political scene."

Further on, Stefko explains the "austerity measures" being applied by Slovak Radio as of 17 January, in connection with the introduction of a new programming structure, which include a reduction in the number of radio stations to three. In spite of these austerity measures, Stefko says, Slovak Radio's costs will exceed its revenues by 84 million korunas this year. He warns that the "intervention against the radio undermines the foundations of Slovak culture" because cultural and educational programs are affected most severely of all. He mentions, for example, that Slovak Radio may be forced to give up its orchestra, which costs 18 million korunas a year and earns only about 5 million korunas.

Stefko also points to Slovak Radio's ambivalent legal status, which makes it possible for the government to treat it the way it does. He says: "Law number 255 states that Slovak Radio is managed as a subsidized organization. At the same time, according to the same law, it can be entered in the company register and has the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity. Hence, we are controlled like a subsidized organization, but, on the other hand, we are not being provided with financial resources like a subsidized organization. Everybody uses this [ambivalence] the way it suits him."

Opposition Adopts Joint Stand on Privatization

AU2701133694 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 25 Jan 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Scope Is Being Created for Corruption; Opposition Parties on the Law on Large-Scale Privatization"]

[Text] Bratislava—At their meeting in Bratislava yesterday, the deputy chairmen of the parliamentary opposition parties adopted a statement on the proposed amendment to the Law on Large-Scale Privatization. The statement was presented to journalists by Ivan Simko, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH].

In the statement, the opposition parties that attended the meeting—the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], the KDH, the Alliance of Democrats of the Slovak Republic, Coexistence, and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement—note that, instead of becoming an economic instrument of the transformation process, privatization has become a political means to concentrate power. Unless changes are made to eliminate the danger of privatization being abused at the forthcoming meeting of parliament, scope for corruption will be created. The opposition parties will support such changes as will make privatization more transparent and effective and prevent its misuse. They expect deputies representing the governing coalition to realize their responsibility toward their voters and to endorse those changes, the statement by the parliamentary nongovernment parties states.

Regarding the KDH's initiative to pass a vote of no confidence in Roman Hofbauer, minister of transportation, communications, and public works, Ivan Simko announced that signatures are still being collected. He believes that it will be possible to raise this issue in the course of the forthcoming meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. SDL Deputy Chairwoman Alzbeta Borzova told the TA SR correspondent that the SDL has "commissioned an analysis" on the extent to which Roman Hofbauer's procedures correspond to "the principle of rationality." The SDL's view on this matter has not yet become crystallized, she said.

Jeszenszky Meets With Ethnic Serbs 25 Jan

LD2501213994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky met representatives of [ethnic] Serbs in Hungary today. Before his departure to Yugoslavia on Thursday [27 January] he wanted to gather information on their situation, to be able to forward their possible request to Belgrade. Kata Peli Nagy reports.

[Peli Nagy] The Serbs of Hungary are also interested in the improvement of Serbian-Hungarian relations because they affect the situation of Serbs in Hungary in a favorable way. Therefore, Hungary's Serb minority of several thousand unanimously welcomes Jeszenszky's Belgrade visit, which is to take place the day after tomorrow. The chairman and deputy chairman of the Democratic Association of Serbs in Hungary told "Chronicle" a few minutes before the beginning of the ministerial meeting: The embargo against Serbia has made keeping contacts with the mother country much more difficult. The situation of teachers who came here to work is unresolved, cultural cooperation is difficult, and links which had been in place have partly been interrupted.

If Jeszenszky intends to receive information on the situation of Hungary's Serbs—numbering about 5,000 to 10,000—the two representatives will raise, among other things, the question of constitutional cultural autonomy, since the Minority Law declares the right to cultural autonomy, but the rights of minorities in connection with this are unclear. To establish autonomy there is a need for a network of cultural institutions and, first and foremost, money. Peter Lasic, the deputy chairman of the association, said that, in their view, the return of Serb church properties would be delayed and the financial situation of the single Serb secondary school should be resolved as well, particularly since the split of the Serbo-Croat educational institution.

The Serb minority representatives, as it is expected to happen in Belgrade too, will probably raise the unsettled matter of parliamentary representation [of minorities] as well.

Jeszenszky Comments on Talks

AU2601145494 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 26 Jan 94 p 3

[Correspondent's report: "Hungarian-Serbian Relations Could Improve—The Chairman of the Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians Will Also Participate in the Belgrade Talks"]

[Text] Prior to his upcoming visit to Belgrade, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky received the chairman and deputy chairman of the Democratic Association of Serbs in Hungary, Milan Nedeljkov and Petar Lastic.

After the talks, Geza Jeszenszky said that he was glad to learn that the Serbs in Hungary do not have complaints that could hinder long-term Hungarian-Serbian cooperation. They agreed that settling the Yugoslav crisis is in the interest of both countries.

Jeszenszky expressed the hope that the obstacles hindering Hungarian-Serbian relations would disappear. He said it was important that the Serbs in Hungary had no problems in having contacts with the mother country despite the international embargo on Rump Yugoslavia. According to Jeszenszky, lifting the sanctions is in the interest of both Hungarians and the international community. Hungary has always urged peace and a just solution.

Answering a question put by NEPSZABADSAG, Geza Jeszenszky expressed his hope that his visit in Belgrade could contribute to easing the rather cold Hungarian-Serbian relations of recent years and to moving away from the deadlock. Jeszenszky hopes that, after the visit, the Serbian press will present an image of Hungarian politics that is closer to reality and is able to dissipate the prejudices and misconceptions.

Previews Visit to Yugoslavia

LD2701102694 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0700 GMT 27 Jan 94

[Text] The Hungarian foreign minister will travel to Yugoslavia today. Prior to his talks, he gave an interview to MAGYAR SZO, the paper of Vojvodina Hungarians. Arpad Madarasz reports from Novi Sad.

[Madarasz] It is a fundamental interest of the two neighboring peoples to live in peace and good-neighborliness with each other, the Hungarian foreign minister told the Novi Sad paper MAGYAR SZO. Geza Jeszenszky stressed that Hungary wishes to have friendly relations with every southern Slav people, and from the beginning of the crisis it has been striving to establish well balanced ties with each successor state of the disintegrating Yugoslavia.

First of all, I would like to see and experience personally how people live in Yugoslavia today and how it feels to be a Hungarian in Vojvodina, said Jeszenszky. He added that he does not expect spectacular results from the visit and talks. However, he expects us to confirm that it is our mutual determination to improve interstate ties gradually, step by step, taking the possibilities into consideration, to restore confidence.

The Hungarian Government supports the autonomy concept of the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMDK], but it does not regard it as its task to discuss this with the Yugoslav Government, Geza Jeszenszky pointed out. However, he said he is pleased to learn that President Milosevic has invited [VMDK leader] Andras Agoston to attend the talks.

'Expert' Views CIA, KGB Information Gathering

AU2501170394 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 25 Jan 94 p 5

[Interview with unnamed intelligence "expert" by Attila Schmidt; place and date not given: "The KGB Is Strong and the CIA Is Rich—There Were No Star Wars in Hungary"]

[Text] Irrespective of their social order, it is extremely important for every country to have a firm economic background, and this can also be seen from their military potential. However, well- founded political, and mainly economic, decisions require the knowledge of at least the plans, concepts, and expected decisions of partner countries. This information can be obtained openly through the press and foreign representations; however, the intelligence services have to be activated for the secret information; the intelligence services will uncover the plans of the other side with the help of agents and other secret means.

No country can avoid the struggle of intelligence services, including Hungary. We spoke about this secret struggle with an expert who does not wish to be named.

[Expert] Intelligence is divided into civil and military sectors. Most medium-sized and smaller countries only have military intelligence services. Of course, this does not mean that these countries would give up the possibility to obtain political, economic, and other information. They put the military intelligence in charge of obtaining such information. The intelligence services of the former Eastern Bloc were organized according to the Soviet KGB model and, thus, a military intelligence was also in operation in addition to a civilian intelligence service.

[Schmidt] Does that mean that this duality stopped after the change in the regime?

[Expert] No; only their names changed: They are active as military and civilian information offices. The same applies to the former partner countries.

[Schmidt] In the past decades, the CIA and the KGB became known as the big "warriors." What was the difference between the two organizations?

[Expert] The essential difference was that while the CIA is an intelligence agency, only Group III/I in the KGB dealt with intelligence gathering, Group III/II dealt with counterespionage, and Group III/III (also famous in Hungary) dealt with domestic surveillance. In the United States, counterespionage belongs to the FBI.

[Schmidt] Which organization was "better," the CIA or the KGB?

[Expert] It is impossible to give a clear answer to this question because, while there was no internal competition within the KGB because the entire organization was directed by a single boss, there is constant rivalry between the CIA and the FBI because each organization is led by a different boss and they have to prove their importance. Thus, the KGB was strong, but the CIA is much richer. However, it is a fact that both organizations carried out a global and total intelligence activity; they were present all over the world and they were interested in everything. As the sole major intelligence power of the world, the CIA has not changed its style these days either.

[Schmidt] What information did the big intelligence agencies want from Hungary?

[Expert] A separate department in the CIA dealt with the Eastern Bloc countries. They were interested in these countries' political and economic concepts, and they were also interested in knowing the situation of the domestic opposition. Naturally, they dealt specially with the main enemy, the Soviet Union. One of the well-tested means of this struggle was to force them into an arms race that involved huge amounts of money. With Star Wars, they forced the Soviets to carry out new military investments.

[Schmidt] What tactics did they use against Hungary?

[Expert] They could not influence us militarily because, compared with the others, we had an "operetta army." Therefore, we were "granted" an almost unlimited amount of credit. Our indebtedness also "derives" from certain intelligence maneuvers. This required that politicians should not be able to resist temptation.

[Schmidt] What intelligence organizations were active in Hungary?

[Expert] The Americans, the West Germans, the British, the French, and the Italians. However, Hungary was not only interesting to the Western intelligence services. Austria was, at that time, already the most friendly country in our neighborhood because the Romanians spied very actively against us, but the East Germans and the Czechoslovaks were also present in Hungary.

[Schmidt] What is the situation today?

[Expert] The East Germans have probably stopped their spying activity in Hungary....

Parties' Economic Programs Examined

AU2501185094 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 25 Jan 94 p 5

[Interview with economic experts of the Hungarian Socialist Party, the Alliance of Free Democrats, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by Henrik Hammang and Sara Szeli; place and date not given: "Party Views on Key Economic Issues—The Owner Is the Main Actor"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

Laszlo Pal: The MSZP Does Not Promise Immediate Prosperity

[PESTI HIRLAP] If the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] gets into a government position, what possibilities do you see of preserving the value of welfare spending and pensions?

[Pal] In the coming period, our party is preparing for crisis management, because the decreased gross national product, the negative processes in foreign trade and agriculture, the very high deficit of the balance of payments, and the domestic budget deficit all point to a very difficult next period, whoever is in government. In our view, it is at the end of 1995 or the beginning of 1996 when a stable situation can turn into an economic upswing, providing that we have a balancing economic policy. I am talking about balancing because, all at the same time, we have to ensure that inflation does not suddenly increase, the balance of payments does not get into a much worse situation, social tensions do not increase more than bearable, and unemployment does not again start to increase, while the country becomes competitive thus ensuring economic growth.

Naturally, in the current situation, without any basis, the MSZP cannot promise higher welfare spending or an immediate improvement in living standards. We feel that the essence of our politics manifests itself in the fact that we want to establish a much more equitable process in the distribution of the social product. Even in this period of crisis management, we must restrain the polarization of the population, the extremely rapid impoverishment of certain strata of society, and the increasing uncertainty of the middle classes. We have said, many times, that the reform of state administration cannot be delayed. [passage omitted]

Attila Karoly Soos: Privatization With Foreign Capital

[PESTI HIRLAP] If the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] gets into government after the elections, how do you plan to solve the stability of pensions and keep them in line with with inflation?

[Soos] The SZDSZ's economic program, in which we seek answers to important social policy questions, has been drawn up, but the National Council has not yet discussed it. Regarding pensions, two major problems have to be taken into consideration. The first is handling the position of pensioners. In our view, we must adhere strictly to the provision in the law that prescribes that pensions have to be adjusted to the average wages. As for the future of the pension system, a general minimum has to be ensured that facilitates decent living standards for elderly people. People who do not receive enough for this from the social security fund will have to have their monthly income supplemented from the state budget. [passage omitted]

[PESTI HIRLAP] Would the SZDSZ increase or decrease the amount of tax payable if it changes the tax system?

[Soos] As an option, we want to introduce the lump sum tax in retail trade and services that functioned well in the past. This would reduce administration. It makes the speculation of expenses unnecessary. According to our surveys, this form of taxation is very popular with the entrepreneurs. This would retrieve the tax lost through abolishing the minimum tax in a way that is voluntarily chosen. Therefore, our proposal to reduce taxes also takes the not- too-rosy budget situation into consideration. [passage omitted]

Gyula Takacsy: The Future Belongs to Private Ownership

[PESTI HIRLAP] The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] is the biggest party of the current government coalition. Which tax laws would you change after the 1994 elections?

[Takacsy] Hungary is in the process of major changes. In 1988, a new tax system was drawn up that resulted in a tremendously increased number of enterprises, together with incomes from the gray and black economies, which are not taxed. These have to be terminated. A very long time is needed for us to reach the level of stability that exists in Germany for example, where tax discipline and control are highly developed. When this is achieved, we can start thinking about abolishing the minimum tax, which is a necessary evil in the current situation. Realistically, we can think about a slow lowering of taxes and making taxation more balanced. We can mainly expect the reduction of company tax, which is a revenue type tax. I cannot foresee the reduction of taxes linked to turnover. [passage omitted] Naturally, it is a very important part of our program that we do not plan radical tax decreases, rather, we say that balance can basically be restored through launching growth. [passage omitted]

[PESTI HIRLAP] To what extent would you be able to reduce the country's foreign debts in the coming four years?

[Takacsy] I do not think that this is our most important task; at the moment, the Hungarian economy is in a situation in which it has to draw on foreign resources because we have too little capital, which is necessary for development. In my view, the debt has to be managed rather than reduced, which essentially means that the repayment of capital amounts can be resolved through taking on new loans, which, in a favorable case, changes the structure of loans, namely turns into longer-term loans, and the interest payments will have to be born out of the Hungarian economy's current balance of payments. In my view, this is not our primary task, because there are very many indebted countries in the world, including the United States. [passage omitted]

Walesa Discusses European Integration

AU2601175994 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 24 Jan 94 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by Peter Fridner in Warsaw on 23 January: "Instead of Fruitless Discussions, Let Us Deal With Concrete Issues"]

[Text] *Warsaw—On the occasion of the visit to Poland by the president of the Slovak Republic [Michal Kovac], Polish President granted an interview to NARODNA OBRODA in his residence at the Warsaw Belveder.*

[Fridner] Your most recent guest comes from a country that became independent only recently. How has the emergence and existence of this state, the Slovak Republic, been received in Poland?

[Walesa] I do not really know how it has been received in Poland. We know that we have to be neighbors, that our relations must be good, and they have the chance to be so. We are only in the process of forming them. How they will look depends on how successful we are going to be in forming them. I am convinced that we are going to be good neighbors, and we will do everything in our power so that our respective countries benefit from the neighborhood.

[Fridner] Are you aware of any political problems between our two countries?

[Walesa] No, I am not aware of any problems. We can be satisfied with our talks and experience to date. That is, however, just a matter of political experience and declarations. So far, we have not been able to project the good into deeds. Of course, we must understand that one cannot ask much from a state that has been organizing for only one year. I am convinced that as the two countries will be able to put their domestic affairs in order, our cooperation will develop and we will reap more benefit therefrom. There are no limits. We have the desire and great hope, but something must be done about their realization. We, politicians, can create the conditions, but we cannot substitute for the directors, managers, or bank owners, who must convert our fine resolutions to practical measures.

[Fridner] That will apparently be the issue in question. Despite the good political relations between our countries, the economic relations have not been developing very favorably. The mutual trade indicators have been declining over the past few years. Are you aware of something that could change this trend?

[Walesa] I would really like to do everything I can to reverse these adverse tendencies. If we had a centrally controlled command system, we might have compelled something. In the system based on economic freedom, however, it is difficult to force the bankers or private businessmen to cooperate. I am convinced that we will show each other what is attractive in our respective countries, and this will be a stimulus for the people who intend to realize our hopes.

[Fridner] Do you think that these questions will play a significant role in your upcoming talks with President Kovac?

[Walesa] I know from our previous meetings with President Kovac that we think alike. I hope that he will bring along people who deal with specific problems, people from enterprises, financiers, and managers. We will get them together with such people from our side, and instruct them to scrutinize our economic possibilities in an expert, technical manner.

[Fridner] Both our countries belong to the Central European region. The guarantee of the security of this region is among its main problems, and that particularly after the reinforcement of the nationalist tendencies in Russia. How do you feel about the situation after the Brussels NATO Summit and the trip of the U.S. President to Europe? My premise is that, in Prague, you had a chance to meet with President Clinton and the presidents of the countries of the Visegrad Group.

[Walesa] We have attained that for which we hoped. Unfortunately, the dearth of solidarity and teamwork on our part has become obvious. Therefore, certain problems have been solved for us by others. I am not denigrating the significance of the Partnership for Peace idea. If we deal jointly with some problems, we can benefit from this initiative in the future. As I say, however, there must be solidarity among us. There must be solidarity in dealing with our common problems. The question of security is one of them. I can tell you that, with President Kovac, we understand each other very well regarding this issue. There is a certain difference of opinion between us and the Czechs, but if we act together, the Czechs will also support us. The U.S. Partnership proposal may be a good idea. Nevertheless, its effect on us will depend on our application.

[Fridner] After the Prague meeting, several commentaries proclaimed that the Visegrad Group was buried there, that it is dead. Do you share this view?

[Walesa] If that were true, it would be against the logic of the present world. After all, if the borders are to be overcome, a regional cooperation is simply a fact, and you cannot do anything about it. One can form various configurations but they must be all based on what the life brings. We are here, in this region, and we are closer to one another than we are to America or elsewhere. The Hungarians, you, and Poland agree on this. Even the Czechs agree, if not on all issues. So far, it has not been politically necessary for us to speak in a single voice. Such a unity was only necessary on issues like the abrogation of the Warsaw Pact or CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance]. The Czechs are right that we are not facing similar problems right now. Regional cooperation is unavoidable. I am in favor of those of us who agree with it taking certain organizational steps now. It can be a cooperation between the Defense or

Foreign Ministries, oriented at solving various problems. In some questions we can proceed jointly, in others individually.

[Fridner] You were one of the main protagonists of the struggle against the communist totalitarianism. How do you feel about the presence of the left-wing forces in the Polish Government, moreover, forces that are to a great degree rooted in the communist camp?

[Walesa] I have spoken about it a lot, and I have not changed my opinion. After 50 years of the one-party system, people are divided into the active and the passive. The active people are further divided into those prepared and those unprepared. The best prepared people come from the power circles. The less prepared are the ones who did not have the power, for instance the members of the Solidarity movement in Poland. Now, as the better prepared rejected all the elements that used to instill society with anxiety, as they promise to build a free social order, a market economy, their superior preparation gives them a better chance of success. Peoples do not wish to fight all the time. They fight when they do not like something, and then they return to work. Those, who offer better solutions, win elections. After some time, five-ten years, when we look at the programs again, we will redistribute ourselves politically. There will be an opportunity to prepare oneself for the government and fulfillment of the program. Actually, nothing happened in Poland, it is a certain law of nature, and similar occurrences can be expected in all other countries.

[Fridner] Do you believe that the left wing will continue with the reform process initiated by the Solidarity governments?

[Walesa] I, as president, and all the other active people, even if less prepared for government, will be on guard regarding our orientation. We will not allow a change of what we have achieved. We will intervene at the slightest deviation. The system, which has been established now, is a good one. The parliament is not as divided as it used to be. We "won in quarrels" various things, but the issues in question were in fact legal solutions. The current parliament is almost unanimous and has a good chance of collecting everything that the previous period indicated and turn it into laws very rapidly. It is a very interesting situation from the vantage point of Polish history.

[Fridner] The Slovak public is quite interested in the fate of their countrymen, the Slovaks living in the most southern part of Poland. To what degree does the Polish state help to implement the rights of this minority, particularly in the spheres of education, culture, and religious services?

[Walesa] These are specific affairs, and they should be dealt with by the governments. Since you asked me, however, I would like to say this: If we are going to be in an integral Europe, these issues will look different. If we are going to be divided, they will surface. Therefore, I would like all these countries—Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—to get in the same orbit. This would eliminate all talk about matters of this type. Everybody would have the freedom of movement but, at the same time, however, he would keep in mind that we live in the same house. Since this has not happened, these problems prevail, and we differ in opinion on them, we can be even dissatisfied. That is, because we are not a part of an integral European organism, there are differences resulting in further differences, and they give rise to problems that lead to such a question as you asked me.

Defense Minister on NATO, Costs, Technology

WS2401180094 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1225 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Interview with Polish Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk by unidentified reporters and an unidentified moderator in Warsaw on the "Hundred Questions to...." program—live; no video available]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Moderator] Good afternoon to you, ladies and gentlemen, to you in the studio, and to you Minister Kolodziejczyk. I have an appeal to make to you, our viewers—we would like to also receive your questions which we will then pass on to the minister. Some of them we will try to answer during the program, and so our phone lines are already open; the number is 625-66-77. We are waiting for your questions and, while we are waiting for them, there will be questions from us, journalists.

Mr. Minister, let us begin with what may seem like a routine issue but which caused quite a bit of confusion last Friday [21 January] when the press, radio, and television circulated reports of your planned dismissal. We have here a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to verify that. What is going on? Are these just rumors? What is this all about?

[Kolodziejczyk] This happened because of ZYCIE WARSZAWY. Of course, the information has absolutely nothing to do with the truth. I am amazed since, up to now, ZYCIE WARSZAWY has been regarded as a daily which provides truthful information.

[Moderator] So that means you are denying the reports.

[Kolodziejczyk] Yes, absolutely.

[Moderator] So the reports are truly false.

[Reporter] But Mr. Minister, what about the reasons which were listed in ZYCIE WARSZAWY—do you think they are not credible, I mean for instance the coalition's pressure to assume deputy- ministerial posts in your ministry? And what about the budget draft, which I take it you are unhappy with and which is currently being worked on in the Sejm, and also the

probable failure of the concept of a National Security Council? Do all these reasons not cause you to consider the possibility of resigning?

[Kolodziejczyk] No, they do not. I assumed the post to solve problems and not to try to avoid solving them or to desert. That is why everything is still ahead of us. The budget has not acquired its final shape yet, whereas issues of personnel appointments have not been on the agenda, and, frankly speaking, there have not been any serious talks on that topic yet....

[Moderator, interrupting] Mr. Minister, I think we will be dealing with these issues later on.

[Reporter] But Mr. Minister, if we were to look at what I will call a conclusion of everything that we are talking about here: This is linked with this alleged dismissal of yours. You are subordinated both to the prime minister and the president. The president is commander of the Armed Forces whereas the prime minister is the government's chief and also your direct superior. Whose order would you execute if it were to turn out that the two officials' orders contradict one another?

[Kolodziejczyk] The president is the constitutional superior over the Armed Forces and he has appropriate powers for that. But what you asked is quite a theoretical proposition because up to now....

[Reporter, interrupting] But it may turn out a [word indistinct] problem.

[Kolodziejczyk] Up to now, both these gentlemen charged with responsibility over the country's security have been cooperating with one another in a way which I think....

[Reporter, interrupting] And what if there was to be a disagreement anyway [word indistinct]?

[Kolodziejczyk, hesitating] I hope that will not happen. After all, the responsibility linked to these people's high posts must prevail. There can be no private views of any kind involved. The interests of the state are what must prevail, and there are no signs so far that it should be otherwise.

[Moderator] Mr. Minister, excuse me. So let us finish the issue of your alleged dismissal. You denied the rumors.

The next issue which I think will be a major theme of our conversation today is the situation which has emerged after the Prague and Brussels summits, and everything going along with that. There were a lot of debates but mainly on the diplomatic side, concerning the sense of safety, grand issues on a high level, but I would like to ask you a blunt question: What about the cost? The cost will probably have to be borne by you. I read in one of your statements that you do not even have the money to open up a bureau in Brussels. So what is the situation practically speaking? What about our participation in joint maneuvers? Who will pay for that?

[Kolodziejczyk] Well, strictly speaking, there is no such item listed in the budget. I have postulated to have the budget supplemented because naturally, these issues will have to be accompanied by expenditures. In any case, the documents of the Brussels summit clearly say that the partners shall bear the cost of their participation. It is a huge problem since we are aware that the NATO countries will come up with some monies and they will be available to those who themselves have contributed in a major way. So far—if the budget is approved in its proposed form—there is really no money for participation in the Partnership for Peace initiative.

[Reporter] On the topic of Partnership for Peace: Leszek Moczulski, chairman of the Confederation for an Independent Poland, said it was a defeat for Polish diplomats whereas other political parties were more restrained in their assessments. What is your evaluation of the proposal, from a military standpoint?

[Kolodziejczyk] I regard Mr. Moczulski's evaluation as a good sign for the initiative's future, since his predictions have to date proved untrue.

[Reporter] My question is very specific. Last Thursday, you held a conference with Foreign Minister Olechowski. You were both working on a kind of letter of intent containing our proposals, I mean a list of goals which we want to achieve within Partnership for Peace. Could you tell us what are our main goals which we want to achieve through the Partnership? And another question, which is linked to that: Do you think that this is a kind of camouflaged path into NATO? I mean camouflaged in the sense that we have to do something so as not to irritate Russia?

[Kolodziejczyk] No, no. First of all, I must make a correction here. The meeting with Minister Olechowski took place face-to-face, so whatever is said as to its topic is just allegations, but I can reveal that information. The Partnership for Peace initiative has been developing [hesitating] quite fast. We must be prepared to undertake the appropriate measures, but the immediate topic of my meeting [with Olechowski] was my two-day visit to Prague, which begins tomorrow, and another visit to Berlin where I will meet German Defense Minister Ruehe. During the meeting with Minister Olechowski, we had to agree on some details and on some topics to be discussed there, and also to agree on some issues which may be the subject of debates both in Prague and Berlin.

[Reporter] Let us continue with the Washington theme. Namely, last Thursday German NTV Television showed pictures during a report from Washington of Minister Olechowski talking to the press and to some experts, and the television reported that while substituting for you [Kolodziejczyk] he informed the Americans about what type of airborne equipment we need, and also what kind of modernization of armored forces and what kind of airborne defense system we need. Can you confirm or deny this information?

[Kolodziejczyk] I think it is a good sign if the foreign minister is a spokesman for the defense minister and if he can competently discuss some issues in my place. Minister Olechowski and I are cooperating quite closely and I think that cooperation will bring about good results.

[Reporter] Mr. Minister, what kind of an amount are we talking about? I mean, by how much would the ministry's budget have to be increased to enable talking about Partnership in reasonable terms? There is talk in the Sejm about a sum of 500 billion zlotys. Is that true?

[Kolodziejczyk] Yes, it is, but let us be more precise here. NATO has about 200 various working groups and if we were to send there just 100 officers this year without special equipment, that in itself would cost about 60-80 billion zlotys. If we want to participate in maneuvers, that will mean additional costs, whereas it is the intensity of our participation precisely in those maneuvers and also in work by the General Headquarters and by other working groups, that determine the rate of Poland's getting close to NATO. We want to see that process of getting close happen.

[Reporter] But where will we get the money, Mr. Minister?

[Kolodziejczyk] That is exactly the question.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] of a social kind of collection, such as in the case of the chief officer of a group of villages, I think from Koscierzyna, who came up with the idea of a fund which would support our Armed Forces [words indistinct]?

[Kolodziejczyk] I regard Mr. Tkaczyk's initiative as a very noble one, and in any event, it has been accompanied by quite a good response, since both people associated with the old National Army [Armia Krajowa] as well as the Podhalanie group and other professional groups—we also saw some street poll results at the program's beginning. Right now, work is going on regarding how to organize a foundation from a legal standpoint—a foundation which could financially support the Army, especially regarding the Army's technical modernization.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] Mr. Minister, how many Polish military officers speak English?

[Kolodziejczyk] About 1,000—this is how many of them are active in various peace missions, so they have some experience in that regard. We keep training them intensively, and not just in Poland. It is of course a problem, but it is not insurmountable. Still, money remains the fundamental problem since it is also needed for language training.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] Mr. Minister, what are in actual fact your priorities as defense minister in relation to the West? Should not these priorities be, for instance, primarily about gaining access to sophisticated technology, and if so—in what areas?

[Kolodziejczyk] Exactly, that is precisely so. That is the most serious problem since if we want to approach NATO standards, then we must have knowledge concerning those standards—that is guaranteed by the Partnership for Peace initiative, that is the first thing. Secondly, we must establish technological cooperation. Our intellectual potential is significant and we are very close to finalizing many, very interesting research and scientific projects. But there is no money for that, including within the Scientific Research Committee since the Army does not have a lot of money, either. Technological cooperation could solve a great deal of our problems based on our research institutes and our industry.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] technological cooperation between Poland and NATO, and that we should be approaching NATO technically speaking. Meanwhile, Hungary intends to purchase—or perhaps they already purchased—a Russian early-warning system which is reported to be the most modern available. Is what you said really the only direction for Poland?

[Kolodziejczyk] [words indistinct] not quite correct information. Hungary has purchased—or rather obtained in lieu of their debt—24 MiG-29 aircraft which are regarded by the NATO countries as contemporary technology, and Hungary also intends to purchase an S-300 antiaircraft defense system. Indeed, when one compares the technical parameters, that system is more efficient and more productive than the Patriot system. We ourselves are considering—unless there are other offers—purchasing the S-300 system.

[Reporter] From Russia?

[Kolodziejczyk] [words indistinct] but that is a kind of topic where I would like to add a few more things: Cooperation with NATO does not mean identical techniques and technologies immediately. The most important aspects are command systems, fire-direction systems, communications systems which would most probably have to be changed as priority, and reconnaissance systems. These will be able to be made uniform quite soon. On the other hand, introducing modern technology within the armored or airborne troops—that has to be extended into a process. Anyway, just take a look if you please, at the state of technology in the Portuguese Armed Forces, for instance—the country is a full NATO member—and a comparison with Portugal is not so bad for us at all....

[Reporter, interrupting] [words indistinct] excuse me. German Defense Minister Ruehe will probably suggest to you in a few days that joint maneuvers should be conducted, and these will take place very soon, that is in September 1994. Can we afford to take part in such maneuvers? Is it your prediction that apart from the joint trilateral naval maneuvers—I mean among Denmark, Germany, and Poland—there will also be land maneuvers? Can we afford that financially?

[Kolodziejczyk] Let us talk about that once I am back from Berlin—right now it would be tantamount to counting our chickens before they are hatched.

[Reporter] Partnership for Peace is also about securing a gradual, civilian, and democratic control over the Army. Meantime, some reforms being conducted in the Defense Ministry—for instance the transfer of the Personnel Department to the General Staff—is kind of a contradiction of that democratic principle.

[Kolodziejczyk] What you are saying was fabricated by the press and has absolutely nothing to do with the truth. As for today, the relationship between civilian-military structures and those purely military ones, is a 50-50 relationship, or close to it. Nobody has any intention of giving up any department for the sake of the General Staff, and as regards the educational functions and the practical work along with the soldier—that must be conducted in the command system, that is to say close to the General Staff. I want to emphasize very strongly that we are aware that one of the most fundamental and cardinal preconditions for our approaching European security structures is a democratic supervision over the Army, that is over the Armed Forces, and we will not give it up.

[Reporter] But Mr. Minister, we are talking here about the Army, which also includes the Military Information Services, so do you think that these services should be subject to parliamentary supervision?

[Kolodziejczyk] Of course they should. Regarding the type of supervision or its extent—that is something to be debated. But the supervision as such must exist and I personally think—this is my personal view—that the Sejm should appoint a group consisting of people enjoying public confidence, for a longer term—something akin to the Constitutional Tribunal or the State Tribunal—and these people would then exercise a very detailed supervision over the military special services. For the time being, a completely different kind of measure is being prepared it seems, the inception of which, by the way, dates back to the 10th Term Sejm but was never implemented in practice.

[Reporter] Mr. Minister, I would like to return for a moment to the Defense Ministry's budget. You are complaining about lack of funds whereas in the meantime, about 4 percent of the budget goes to the Defense Ministry's central agencies. The central agencies represent military bureaucracy. The funds spent on that purpose have not decreased during recent years—that means that military bureaucracy is also getting stronger.

[Kolodziejczyk] Listen, it is 4 percent but it is not spent on the bureaucracy—that is what the whole misunderstanding is about. The 4 percent is also spent on investments, including computerization, introducing information systems—everything that is linked with technical progress and that is why we should not ignore the fact that included in the 4 percent are all the other sections without which we will never approach the level of any contemporary army in today's world.

[Reporter] Mr. Minister, you said you are very aware of the importance of civilianization of the military services—that is the Army—as one of the important preconditions for joining NATO. But your first step after assuming the post of minister was to suspend the internal regulations issued by the former minister, who had acted in the direction of a firm civilianization of the Defense Ministry. How would you explain that?

[Kolodziejczyk] Very simply. First of all, the internal regulations had indeed been approved but they were never implemented in practice. There were some controversial provisions included there which failed to delineate clear lines of division of powers—that is the primary thing. But there is also the aspect that the law on the Armed Forces' functioning is tangled up and in disarray, and we began the process of remedying that from the top down: The prerogatives of the Republic of Poland's Security Council, the Council of Ministers' Defense Affairs Committee, amendments made to the Law on the Popular Defense Obligation which will make a very precise kind of distinction [hesitating] between [word indistinct] and obligations or powers of a civilian defense minister and the chief of the General Staff, followed by corrections made to the internal rules you mentioned. To do it in reverse order would lead to an even greater discrepancy than the one we have right now.

[Reporter] Mr. Minister, there are approximately as many people working in our arms industry as there are in the Armed Forces. What is your evaluation of the role of the Polish arms industry in the efforts to increase the country's security? Is there not any neglect here in terms of doctrine, in terms of what we really want, or is it just an issue of money?

[Kolodziejczyk] No, there is no neglect of this kind, but we are struggling with what is the legacy of the past period. Our [arms] industry until recently—that is as recently as four years ago—produced 50 percent of its production for the purposes of the Armed Forces and the other 50 percent was exported out of the country. Currently the exports have died out completely, the Armed Forces' demand decreased to what are outright symbolic figures, and so the huge industry and its potential is not being used. Military orders alone are not enough to keep the industry afloat, it needs to be restructured soon, it needs a definition of those areas which have good future prospects, as well as those that are not profitable in which case....

[Reporter, interrupting] So could you define them?

[Kolodziejczyk] Listen, we have already been through that. I could well define them once I learn in what areas of technology we will be able to cooperate with the West. That is the fundamental issue without which we will fail to decide what to sustain. But it is an obvious truth that a sovereign state must base its Army's supplies on domestic industry to a large extent.

[Reporter] But on the other hand, the Defense Ministry refuses to purchase quite modern IRYD aircraft and at the same time the ministry maintains completely obsolete and costly MiG-21 aircraft. One hour of operation by such an aircraft costs about 50 million zlotys. Can you not see that these aircraft devour the money that could be spent on IRYD aircraft that could be manufactured?

[Kolodziejczyk] Listen, one just cannot confuse the functions of an education-training aircraft with those of a combat aircraft. Unfortunately, the MiG-21's are being withdrawn, they will not be subjected to overhauls or supplemented with [word indistinct] electronic equipment, which is the case for instance with MiG-29's. Still, we need them for the time being since we are below the level of [word indistinct]. The IRYD on the other hand—under the assumptions guiding it—was to be an education-combat aircraft, but the industry failed to implement that assumption....

[Reporter, interrupting] But it can still be such an aircraft [words indistinct].

[Kolodziejczyk] If it becomes such an aircraft, then we will start purchasing it. But it is not the case for the time being and the industry is doing very little—or practically nothing—to fulfill those preconditions which had been set at the initial phase of the process of designing the aircraft.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] will you devote to Polish industry this year?

[Kolodziejczyk] Out of the Defense Ministry's budget? It will be about 15 percent. As far as I... I am sorry. Let me put it another way: 75 percent of what there is, goes for arms purchases and the remaining 15 percent will be for indispensable purchases of spare parts as well as for overhauls of post-Soviet equipment since our industry does not have the capability to produce the parts.

[Reporter] On the issue of post-Soviet: Mr. Minister, do you not think that the Soviet Union could use Partnership for Peace to make a faster and more effective approach to the West than Poland, which would then create a kind of political gap? That is my first question, and I have another one related to the first question: Namely, the current governing coalition regards improvement of relations with the East as one of its priorities, parallel to the strategic goal of getting closer to NATO. What is your perspective on this? Do you see any chance at all for such cooperation with the East regarding security policy in a situation where the East is not making it easy for you, for instance—ignoring for a moment the issue of military doctrine—by refusing to decrease the levels of heavy armaments?

[Kolodziejczyk] You know, these are extremely complicated issues. You asked whether Russia will not get ahead of us in its efforts to be a NATO member. The political situation is a precondition to even begin talking about Partnership for Peace—by political situation I mean a democratic regime, clarity of military budgets, democratic supervision over the Army, and so on and so forth. I hope that kind of process has been initiated in Moscow, although recent news from there does not indicate that the process could be fast. Well, from a technological standpoint I am sure Russia would be a more interesting partner than us—I mean aircraft, rockets, not to mention cluster weapons, to name just a few. Now, regarding creation of security for our country, I think there are four parallel paths involved here: The first one is precisely about good cooperation and relationships with all our neighbors and, at least as far as we in the Defense Ministry are concerned, we are trying to build such good relationships. A second issue—or a second path if you like—is regional cooperation to which we will be condemned for many years to come, for instance by using the same kind of technology—I will not discuss this in detail, we will talk about this in Prague, as well. A third direction is about getting closer to the European security structures, while a fourth one is about activation of disarmament, I mean the Vienna disarmament process. The fewer weapons there are—and there are still whole arsenals of nuclear weapons in Europe to the east of our borders—the less security, naturally. [sentence as heard]

[Reporter] Do you believe that Ukraine will get rid of its nuclear weapons like it declared during the Clinton-Yeltsin-Kravchuk meeting?

[Kolodziejczyk] I hope it will.

[Reporter] Mr. Minister, you said a moment ago that we must establish technological cooperation with NATO countries. Does Poland have access to the latest technologies right now?

[Kolodziejczyk] Unfortunately, we do not; but we are looking for alternative solutions. We have cooperation with the Swedes which looks promising, with a company as famous as Thompson, which is already in cooperation with us with regard to production of reconnaissance, identification, and navigation systems which will make it possible to release some additional frequency channels for television.

[Moderator] [Words indistinct] I have a few questions here precisely on that issue: What is you perspective on the issue of granting frequencies to television stations? [Former Defense] Minister Onyszkiewicz kept saying it was apparently possible.

[Kolodziejczyk] Whatever was possible, was done—I am saying that with full responsibility for my words. In any case, this is an issue for the Communications Ministry, with which we have signed appropriate agreements....

[Reporter, interrupting] [Words indistinct] done in that case because you said whatever possible....

[Kolodziejczyk, interrupting] Those channels which the Army is now using—we cannot release them because of the security of flights and because of state security.

[Reporter] So that means that the National Radio and Television Council holds sessions and interviews candidates [to receive frequency channels] almost for their own sake, but the Army does not intend to release any additional frequencies anyway?

[Kolodziejczyk] First of all, one must sit down at a table and begin talking. So far this has not happened. We have been debating through the mass media and [passage indistinct] and the three channels is the absolutely minimum amount indispensable to the Army and as we keep introducing new technologies—especially radiolocating and electronic ones—we will be surrendering these channels, but there is resistance....

[Reporter, interrupting] On the issue of talking to one another through the Sejm. The Sejm National Defense Commission has criticized in the past the concentration of different functions performed by Minister Milewski. Do you think that there cannot be more than two deputy ministers in the ministry? I think that would resolve a great many political problems....

[Kolodziejczyk, interrupting] I am sure we could use another deputy minister just to act as sentry on the government's benches during Sejm sessions, since it requires enormous amounts of time.

[Reporter] I have a very specific question: How do you intend to go about solving the following issue....

[Kolodziejczyk, interrupting] But I did not answer completely a moment ago. The controversial case of Minister Milewski is completely different than what the press presents to their readers or viewers. The press is telling only part of the truth. The other part is that his appointment is linked to the intention to reform the entire management scheme of the state's security apparatus, where the National Security Bureau—or practically the National Council's Secretariat—will be performing technical functions. The point is to avoid repeating some functions within the Army's and the National Security Bureau's structures, and that is why the post will be absolutely of a technical nature; it is acceptable and there are no legal impediments to that. On the contrary, I will say it could facilitate transferring tasks from the National Council's decisionmaking area to the executive area, that is the Defense Ministry or the Council of Ministers and the Council of Ministers' Defense Affairs Committee I mentioned before, which I hope will be established soon.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] directs two ministries?

[Kolodziejczyk] That is a matter of convention. Social and defense policies are reconcilable, and there is also the issue of the number of director-generals and so forth who are a step below, and we have to keep in mind we are trying to fight bureaucracy. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Mr. Minister, the rate of increase of religious chaplains in the Army has been the same as the increase in the popularity of the weekly NIE among the cadre. So my question is: What are the guiding principles behind the education process in the Army currently, and also: Are not the educators' minds in a whirl?

[Kolodziejczyk] Listen, the Army is indeed the last institution which has been trying to continue—I repeat: continue—the education process. It is not possible during a year and a half to make up for neglect which began back in kindergarten, high school, or even in the family. We must be very clear on that. But as regards reading NIE, I think that the popularity rate is not very different from what happens generally in society. Above all, if we talk about democracy—including in the Army, which has to be somewhat limited there—then let us not try to force soldiers to read this and not read that. It is an issue of their will and that will must be respected. [passage omitted]

Defense Ministry, General Staff Chiefs on Army

WS2701113494 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27 Jan 94 p 2

[Report by Zbigniew Lentowicz: "An Armed Caravan Is Going"]

[Text] "There have always been and there still are temptations to dominate the Army," declared Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk at a 26 January news conference in the Warsaw Conference Center of the National Defense Ministry.

The minister stressed that he always opposed such tendencies, because especially in the period of the transformation of the Army "they cause harmful chaos in the Armed Forces." He added that if the political manipulations exceed a certain limit and if in the near future, there is a culmination of unfavorable phenomena, such as the budget debate which was unfavorable to the Army, he may come to the conclusion that there is no place for him in Warsaw. For the time being, however, "as long as his hands are not tied," the possibility of resignation is out of the question. Because he is not used to deserting because of difficulties, "the caravan will continue," said Kolodziejczyk; he carefully evaded answering the question of who exactly is trying to politically dominate the Army and what the manipulations are. He merely said that in recent days, he had met with Deputy Prime Minister Cimoszewicz in order to discuss the issue of the final decisions concerning the model for steering the Ministry of National Defense [MON]. These problems will probably be resolved at the end of this month or the beginning of next month, the MON head expects; he hopes that it will be not a "contemporary model, but a model for years."

MON roughly estimates that the costs of the "Partnership for Peace" program will amount to nearly 0.5 trillion zlotys [Z]. Approximately Z60 to Z80 billion are needed to establish our military mission with the NATO leadership in Brussels. We would have to spend Z420 billion for participating in this year's training.

Kolodziejczyk is determined to maintain the civilian control over the Army; the control should be such as it is envisioned in the standards accepted by Western Europe and NATO. "It is with disgust that I read reports on the alleged conflict on the border of the civilian and military segments within MON," the minister was backed up by General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the general staff. He mentioned that there are sometimes differences of opinion; however, in a situation in which difficult problems must be resolved, this is entirely understandable. Jerzy Milewski, first deputy of the minister and head of the National Security Office, evaluates press enunciations bluntly as "false and outrageous." "Well, I have found myself in the ministry at the motion of Minister Kolodziejczyk," explained Milewski; in addition, his superior gave assurances that they had known each other for ages and the cooperation between them was developing very well.

After one year's experiences in the area of steering the Armed Forces in line with new rules, General Wilecki announced on Wednesday [26 January] that there would be serious changes, not only in the central establishments of the Army.

The General Staff, as the chief command body, will include newly established inspectorates (or centers of command) of the naval and air forces; the General Staff chief believes that this will place these forces higher to the strategic level, which will strengthen their position in the Army. Transforming the model of the functioning of the quite extensive Air Forces and Air Protection Forces will entail serious reductions of forces and equipment; at least 20 airfields will become redundant. "However, local communities increasingly often protest liquidating the garrisons that the strategists decided should be liquidated. Self-governmental authorities are willing to stop collecting fees—only if the Army stayed in the town," says General Wilecki.

The establishment of the experimental "ground-air" Krakow district will be continued; so far the process is half-way completed (it is scheduled for completion in 1997). Within its framework, the following formations will be established: 14th brigade in Przemysl, 21st brigade in Rzeszow, 23d brigade in Gliwice. In addition, the Krakow and Lublin garrisons will be extended. The experiences gained in the Krakow district will be useful in the future, in building a mobile brigade system, adjusted to the structures accepted in NATO.

In the area of the Lodz Voivodship a division of armored cavalry will be established. Three regiments: in Leczyca, Tomaszow Mazowiecki, and Nowe Miasto will be equipped with Polish "Huzar" helicopters, light anti-infantry, and antitank weapons. This way some kind of fast reaction forces will be established; General Wilecki calls them formations of "winged infantry."

A committee that is working on the new model of military education is completing its work. As early as this autumn, the first officers cadets will be trained in line with new rules. The number of schools will be decreased by half; some persons of the didactic cadres will be transferred to "future-oriented" schools.

Minister Kolodziejczyk estimates the redundant military property that has been left over by the once-twice-as-big Polish Army at Z2 trillion. After a period of great interest at the beginning, no one wants to buy the empty barracks and store-rooms (the Army, in order to protect them from devastation, is spending its money). The minister hopes that this government will see to this problem. So far there has not been an appropriate agency that would free the Army of this burden.

Pawlak Urges Media To Demonstrate 'Integrity'

LD2701123694 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 27 Jan 94

[Text] *Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak visited the Polish Press Agency [PAP] this morning. During a brief meeting of the agency management he spoke about the need for journalistic integrity.*

[Begin Pawlak recording] I hope that PAP will deal with facts and information related to facts and not with spreading feelers put out by other media. This, I think, is a general issue that concerns mass media in general, to concentrate on facts—and on important facts—and not make a huge story out of minor matters. It often happens that once a story is verified it is hard to tell where it originated, but by that time it is all over the place.

So, I think that such an agency as PAP should serve as an example of reliability and publish information that is important to the public, the state, and the economy. [end recording]

Asked what feelers he had in mind, Prime Minister Pawlak recalled the issue of the Concordat.

[Begin Pawlak recording] There was a situation when a well known local radio set in motion an avalanche of suppositions, speculations, and considerations around alleged expert reports. Later, when there was a joint statement by the government and episcopate press offices, it seemed like the reports could hardly get through.

I understand that sensations should find their way to the consumers, but journalistic integrity requires equal treatment of information concerning facts and correction of information if it is untrue. But it would be best not to deal with untrue information at all. [end recording]

Poll Shows Diminishing Support for Government

WS2601145694 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Jan 94 p 2

[Report by B.I.W.: "CBOS: A Cabinet for More Than a Year"]

[Text] Since December, support for the government has been on the wane; nevertheless, the government still has more supporters (45 percent) than opponents (18 percent). Almost 50 percent of respondents to a public opinion poll believe that the present government will stay in power for more than a year.

Over the last two years, the number of people who support the idea of increasing the president's influence on the work of the government has decreased. Forty percent of respondents believe that the policy of the government offers a chance for overcoming the crisis, even though since November the number of optimists has decreased quite noticeably (by almost 15 percent). For the first time since the Pawlak government was formed, 37 percent of Poles are of the opinion that this government is neither better nor worse than the previous one; 34 percent believe it is better.

This research study was conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] between 14 and 17 January with a representative sample of adult Poles.

Poll Shows Disapproval for Voivode Changes

WS2701142194 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by R.W.: "Against a Purge of Voivodes"]

[Text] "Voivodes that belong to parties other than the governing ones are recalled unfairly," say more than half of the respondents to an opinion poll conducted by the Sopot Public Opinion Research Institute [PBS] at the request of RZECZPOSPOLITA. "The issue of who should fill the post of a voivode should not be determined by party membership," believe almost three-fourths of respondents. The replacement of voivodship heads of the state administration, announced by the peasant-social democratic government, is rather moderately supported by the public.

So far the Pawlak government has recalled ten voivodes (the eleventh voivode is supposed to be recalled toward the end of January, when he returns from sick leave); eight new voivodes have been appointed. The vacant posts are in Lublin and Rzeszow. Representatives of the governing coalition said more than once that only the future of ten, or maybe a little over a dozen voivodes, could be classified as safe. The main criterion for the central authorities was supposed to be the fact whether a given voivode had good or bad relations with the local structures of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. Any protests by activists of these parties is the first step to dismiss the head of the local governmental administration. There appear statements that the issue of filling this post should be decided by the party that won the parliamentary elections in the particular voivodship. It is worth recalling that SLD won in 25 voivodships, PSL in 21, Democratic Union [UD] in 2, and the German minority in one. In a radio statement, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak said jokingly that for him the unparalleled model is Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who had replaced all the voivodes. His opponents point out that the situation is incomparable, because in 1989 and 1990 a most fundamental change in the political system was under way. On New Year's Eve, the present government recalled five voivodes; this is half as many as the Suchocka government did during its entire time in office.

It is still unclear of what nature the post of a voivode should be: whether it should be an apolitical representative of the "civil service" [preceding two words in English], or a representative of the governing coalition who is at its full political disposal. The law on the state civil service, which many people hope will finally settle this issue, has still not even reached a session of the Council of Ministers.

Most of the representatives of all the groups questioned by PBS are convinced that the issue of filling a voivode post should not be determined by party membership (74 percent of the answers, whereas 18 percent of the respondents are of the opposite opinion). Acceptance of the idea of making the voivode post party-related is most often expressed by supporters of SLD and the Union for Real Politics.

The recalls that have been made so far—recalls of voivodes who belong to parties other than the governing ones—are approved by 26 percent of respondents; they are disapproved of by 55 percent, and 18 percent refrain from expressing an opinion either way. Support for such changes are most often declared by supporters of SLD, PSL, as well as the Union of Labor and the Confederation for an Independent Poland; however, even in these groups they are in the minority. The greatest doubts are expressed by supporters of the parties that not long ago were still in power: UD, Liberal-Democratic Congress, as well as the groupings comprising the former "Fatherland" coalition.

The opinion poll was conducted on 15 and 16 January with a representative sample of 1,064 adult Poles.

[Box, p 1]

Should the issue of the filling the post of a voivode be determined by party membership?

42 percent—definitely not

32 percent—probably not

13 percent—probably yes

5 percent—definitely yes

8 percent—hard to say

Three More Provincial Governors Dismissed

LD2601192494 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1603 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 26 Jan (PAP)—The chairman of the Council of Ministers has dismissed the following voivodas: Stanislaw Czuba in Skierniewice with effect from 26 January, Eugeniusz Matyjas in Leszno with effect from 31 January, and Jerzy Orzel in Tarnow with effect from 31 January. This was reported by the government press office today.

The prime minister thanked the dismissed voivodas for their work in state administration.

Defense Minister on 'Partnership,' Polish Ties

WS2601160594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Jan 94 p 23

[Interview with Romanian Defense Minister Niculae Spiroiu by Ryszard Malik; place and date not given: "Politics Is Decided by the Strongest"]

[Text] [Malik] The "Partnership for Peace" initiative—a program for all former communist countries proposed by NATO in Brussels—does not fully satisfy the Poles. As you probably know, Poland had its own vision of a future security structure in Europe. How does Romania assess the "Partnership for Peace" plan?

[Spiroiu] I think the NATO proposal is a good resolution for our part of Europe, for all countries of the former communist bloc. It does not single out or discriminate against anyone, and, first of all, it does not draw any new borders or a new geopolitical divisions within Europe. The Romanian Army seeks integration with NATO. This is in line with our foreign policy, the key goal of which is the preservation of peace and stability in the region. I would like to stress that all political forces agree on this. Romania is not interested in conflicts with any country. On the contrary, it longs to see peace in the Balkans, in the former Yugoslavia. I would like to remind everyone that due to the embargo imposed on our exports to the new Yugoslavia, our state loses millions of dollars annually. Romania understands, however, that there is no other way to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia than through dialogue. Despite great losses endured through support for such policy, Romania will not break free from the group of countries observing these sanctions.

I suppose, however, that the "Partnership for Peace" in its current form does not satisfy all countries or meet all their expectations—particularly in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. I understand that, for example, German policy seeks to move NATO's borders farther to eastward. However, what might be good for Germany does not mean that it could meet the expectations of all Central and East European countries. Romania speaks out for the creation of a security structure throughout Europe that would eliminate the fear of new conflicts and treat all states on an equal footing, without any privileges.

[Malik] At the same time, you support Russia's position, which blocked Poland's admission to NATO....

[Spiroiu] I also understand Russian fears of NATO expansion with new members. Such an outcome would serve all those who oppose the continuation of the democratic process in Russia begun by President Boris Yeltsin, all conservative and pro-imperialist forces. It would be grist for the mill of such people as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. In this situation, "Partnership for Peace" is the optimal but not the final solution. It is also a good endeavor for another reason—it coincides with the period of transformation that our part of Europe is now experiencing, and the changes in NATO which is trying to find a place for itself after the end of the Cold War.

[Malik] Prior to the NATO meeting in January, President Ion Iliescu criticized the proposal of joint guarantees for Central and East European countries provided by the Americans and Russians. Do you not think that such guarantees would actually mean a new Yalta?

[Spiroiu] I will respond briefly: Politics is decided by the strongest.

[Malik] Over recent years, Romania, like other countries of the former communist bloc, has changed its foreign and defense policies. What changes have occurred in the Army?

[Spiroiu] Following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the socialist bloc, we began to adjust the Army to meet the new situation. Under the agreement on conventional armed forces, the Romanian Army can retain the maximum number of 230,000 servicemen. We predict that in the future it will be an Army based on professional soldiers to a great extent. "Partnership for Peace" meets our expectations and as it confirms the expediency of the covered course concerning the reorganization of the Army. The aim of this reorganization was to adjust our military structures to West European standards, particularly to NATO structures.

[Malik] Polish-Romanian relations are not assessed as very good, and I became convinced of this during a visit of mine to Bucharest. How does military cooperation look against this backdrop?

[Spiroiu] Good and friendly relations have existed between Romanian and Polish citizens, as well as between our states, throughout history. Over the last two years, we have begun the restoration of the ties we severed after the changes in both countries. I believe that our armies should also have good relations. I am saying with regret, however, that currently there is no closer cooperation despite a number of initiatives undertaken since 1991. Some unforeseen circumstances have always hampered the conclusion of such an agreement, for example, the replacement of the Polish defense minister, and last year's elections in Poland. I hope that a relevant agreement will be signed shortly.

PDSR Approves Coalition Formula

AU2701090294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 27 Jan 94

[Excerpts] The Central Executive Bureau of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] held a meeting yesterday, which was attended by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, other ministers, and PDSR members. [passage omitted]

At the end of the meeting, PDSR President Adrian Nastase made a brief statement to the press. He mentioned that discussions regarding the negotiations with the parties that form the majority in parliament were

very heated. After four hours, the Central Executive Bureau unanimously approved the formula of a coalition government open to all parties that belong to the current parliamentary majority. Adrian Nastase said that this act should be preceded by the preparation of a draft political pact open to all parties, as well as a political understanding between all five parties—namely the PDSR, PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], the PRM [Greater Romania Party], the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor], and the PDAR [Romanian Democratic Agrarian Party].

Likewise, Adrian Nastase mentioned that it is necessary to achieve a consensus on an anticrisis and anti-inflation program. After its drafting, consultations will continue with a view to setting up a parliamentary coalition government by 1 March.

Mr. Adrian Nastase also expressed his surprise that these elements discussed with the aforementioned parties on 21 January in the evening were not taken into consideration at the meeting of the PUNR National Council. Mr. Adrian Nastase also stressed that the Central Executive Bureau wants to reaffirm the willingness of the PDSR for a political dialogue with the parliamentary parties in the opposition, noting that this dialogue might take place at the end of the next week.

Referring to the memorandum convened between the Romanian Government and the IMF, Mr. Nastase informed the correspondents present that the participants in the meeting of the Central Executive Bureau agreed unanimously that it is necessary for the parliament to adopt a declaration in which it expresses support for this memorandum as soon as possible.

Miners Strike Grows; 65,000 Stop Work

AU2601133894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] The labor conflict begun by the Rovinari Federation of Free Trade Unions has spread, practically speaking, throughout the coal mining region administered by the Targu Jiu Autonomous Lignite Public Corporation, our correspondent Titus Stoichitoiu reports. Over 65,000 employees have stopped work, the only departments still functioning being those that transport personnel inside the pits and deliver coal to the population.

Another warning strike and a rally was announced today by employees of the Targu Jiu [mining equipment] Repair Plant. Similarly, the Lignite Mining Trade Union Confederation, which is affiliated to the union confederation headed by Miron Cosma [union leader of the Jiu Valley miners], requested permission to organize a rally at Rovinari, but the local police and mayor's office refused, suggesting that it should be postponed until after the general strike in the region.

SRI Head Talks With Chinese on Drugs, Crime

AU2601100794 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 22 Jan 94 p 8

[Dan Damian report: "Virgil Magureanu Holds Talks With the Chinese Intelligence Service on the Asian Drug Dealer Networks"]

[Text] Virgil Magureanu, director of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], has been to Beijing, China over the past week. Being there at the invitation of China's public security minister, Magureanu held a series of talks with representatives of the Chinese intelligence service aimed at sharing information gathered by the two intelligence services in an effort to combat drug trafficking.

Another goal of the visit is related to the fact that since 1989 Romania, like other Eastern European countries, has been facing a crime wave in which Asians are also involved and some of these violations could also threaten Romania's national security.

The SRI director, carrying a (black) Romanian diplomatic passport, left for Beijing on a TAROM [Romanian national airline] charter flight.

Editorial Views Tudor's Espionage Accusations

AU2601212494 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 20 Jan 94 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "A Scandal That Cannot Be Ignored"]

[Text] The last issue of the weekly ROMANIA MARE devotes almost a whole page to an article entitled: "The Establishment and Functioning of an Organized Group, Under the Direction of Certain Foreign Secret Services, That Penetrated High Official Positions." Such a title is not surprising in the least for the magazine headed by [Greater Romania Party President] Corneliu Vadim Tudor. As one can see, the paper expresses the obsession of Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Ilie Neacsu, and other native nationalist-communists who see everywhere smaller or bigger spies that have come to Romania from all parts of the world, by ship or by plane, to be discovered and seized by our brave and well-fed patriots. In this respect it is easy to notice that the title strikingly reminds us of the reports devoted by the SCINTEIA [official organ of the former Romanian Communist Party] of the fifties to the trials of "certain saboteurs, spies, and agents of English-U.S. imperialism."

Under this sign of the Stalinist spy-game that disappeared in the early days of the Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej [first Romanian post-war leader] regime and reappeared and is flourishing in the Iliescu regime, the ROMANIA MARE weekly accuses some of the current state officials of being spies. The respective officials are the following: Adrian Nastase, president of the Chamber of Deputies and executive president of the ruling party [Social Democracy Party of Romania]; Minister of State Dan Mircea Popescu; Ioan Mircea Pascu, secretary of state at

the Ministry of National Defense; and Ioan Talpes, head of the SIE [Foreign Intelligence Service]. Together with others, the aforementioned persons are revealed as belonging to an organized group that has infiltrated the structures of our country's leadership in order to promote the policy and interests of foreign powers. In the Romanian press that appeared after the 1989 December revolution, many stupid things were published on the issue of certain public figures having been members of various spy networks that were established in Romania. Unfortunately, the so-called revelations have not appeared only in the pages of the nationalist-communist press, but also in the pages of the independent press. Therefore, without any proof, the members of the leadership and of the opposition were accused of being members of the CIA, KGB, and Mossad. At first glance, the ROMANIA MARE article should be counted as another proof of journalistic dilettantism, seriously influenced by the cheap thrillers read by their authors. That is how, I believe, the officials accused by ROMANIA MARE viewed the respective article, because, although quite some time has passed since the publication of that article, they still keep silent and pretend that nothing has happened. I believe that this position of ignoring things adopted by the respective personalities is erroneous. The scandal has much greater proportions than what the accused ones believe or allow to be believed. The respective article was not published in just any publication, but in the weekly whose owner and director is the leader of a party that is part of the government coalition. Had the accusation come from the opposition or independent press, there would be no need to notice it. It has already become a nervous tic of Corneliu Vadim Tudor to denounce the opposition and the independent press as being full of English and U.S. spies. However, the article is talking about members of the current leadership. And this leadership makes a great fuss about the issue of the fierce battle that it wages to defend the independence and sovereignty of the country. Within this context, the denunciation by the Greater Romania Party leader (that is, the leader of a party that is a member of the government coalition) of an espionage network that penetrated the leadership, at such a high level of the government, Chamber of Deputies, the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Army should provoke a rapid and firm stance by those who are involved and the respective institutions that are in charge of watching over national security. Needless to say that had a foreign espionage network penetrated the structures of our leadership, that would be one of the most serious attempts against the sovereignty and independence of our country. The stand of those public figures should make things clear to the public. Either what Corneliu Vadim Todor published in the ROMANIA MARE weekly is true, and in that case the accused persons should not only be urgently removed from office but also brought to justice, or the accusations included in the respective article are completely erroneous, and in that case, the Social Democracy Party of Romania and Ion Iliescu must definitively break the alliance with Corneliu Vadim Tudor. The act of launching false accusations against high officials of the state proves the completely irresponsible attitude of the PRM leader. And the presence of such an irresponsible person in the structures of the country's leadership—thanks to the alliance with the PDSR and thanks to Ion Iliescu—is just as serious an attempt on the national security as the existence of an espionage network that penetrated Romania's top leadership.

Croats Prevent Evacuation of Sick Civilians

AU2701144294 Paris AFP in English 1428 GMT 27 Jan 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Jan 27 (AFP)—Bosnian Croat forces Thursday prevented the UN from evacuating ill civilians from the Moslem sector of Mostar, in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, a spokesman for the UN High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] said.

Spokesman Kris Janowski said the evacuation of 22 patients and 16 of their relatives had to be called off after the Croat forces (HVO) [Croatian Defense Council] failed to give authorisation for it to go ahead.

Among the ill was a five-year-old girl with bone cancer who needed urgent medical attention, he said.

A spokeman for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) meanwhile said intense fighting broke out Wednesday between the mainly-Moslem Bosnian Army and the HVO at Fojnica, 40 kilometers (25 miles) west of here.

Spokesman Idesbald van Biesebroeck said UN military observers who reported renewed clashes between Bosnian-controlled Fojnica and the Croat-held town of Bakovici, three kilometers (two miles) away, had no further details.

The new outbreak of fighting came after Croat forces Monday recaptured the Moslem village of Here, near Prozor, 30 kilometers (20 miles) south of Fojnica.

The village has great strategic significance for the defense of Jablanica and Konjic, towns under Bosnian control, and for communication between Sarajevo and central Bosnia.

The mountainous village of Here and two others held by Bosnian forces, Kute and Scipe, stand along a road built by Croat forces to link Kiseljak, 30 kilometers west of Sarajevo, to western Herzegovina, which they control.

UN observers also reported renewed exchanges of light and heavy automatic gunfire at Gornji Vakuf, in central Bosnia, between the Bosnian Army and the HVO.

Serb forces stepped up their bombing of Sarajevo on Wednesday, wounding eight civilians, Lieutenant-Colonel van Biesebroeck added.

He said 350 shells hit the Bosnian capital. Of these, 60 percent were aimed at Bosnian positions on Mount Zuc, 30 percent at the southwestern districts of Dobrinja and Mojmilo and 10 percent at the centre of town.

Silajdzic Calls for Bombing Those Impeding Aid

AU2601172794 Paris AFP in English 1701 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Jan 26 (AFP)—Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic called Wednesday for bomb attacks on groups which seek to prevent aid convoys from reaching their destinations. He made the call after civilians shot and wounded six policemen escorting a UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] aid convoy in central Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Speaking alongside the new commander of UN forces in Bosnia, British General Michael Rose, with whom he had held a short session of talks, Silajdzic said:

"People are dying of hunger while some people block roads. Whether they are Serb, Croat or Bosnian, they should be bombed because they're killing the population through hunger.... Freeing up aid corridors is the key issue, anything else is of secondary importance."

He regretted that although UN forces on the ground sought to help, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) did "not have the mandate."

Rose, who took over the troubled UN command on Monday amid acrimonious debate on how the international community should end the conflict here, refused to comment on the Bosnian's remarks.

But he said that earlier, during his first meeting with Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic, he had assured Ganic the UN force "would do all it could to continue to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and to assist with the peace process in this country".

"I don't think in the near future we are going to see any changes in the mandate I have been given," he added.

Earlier Wednesday, six Bosnian policemen were shot and wounded as the UNHCR aid convoy they were escorting came under fire from civilians in central Bosnia, a spokesman for UNHCR said here.

Another policeman was wounded by civilian fire Tuesday in the same circumstances and in the same area, UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said, adding that the Zenica-Kakanj road had been closed after the two attacks.

The attacks took place in the village of Ticici, near Kakanj, 60 kilometres (35 miles) northwest of Sarajevo, in an area controlled by the Moslem-dominated Bosnian army.

The UNHCR convoy heading toward Tuzla and accompanied by 12 Bosnian policemen was stopped by civilians at Ticici, where gunfire coming from one of the houses hit and wounded six of the policemen. The police escort had been strengthened after the first armed attack on Tuesday, Janowski said.

In the Tuesday incident, the convoy had left Zenica, 70 kilometres (44 miles) northwest of the capital, for Kakanj with a five-man Bosnian police escort Tuesday morning. It was stopped near Ticici by a crowd of some 300 Moslem men, women and children.

Janowski said the UNHCR was "very worried" about the growing number of incidents aimed at UN convoys over the past few weeks.

Since the beginning of January, several UNHCR aid convoys have been blocked in central Bosnia. The crowds blocking the convoys, usually made up of women and children, often managed to flee with part of the aid. Much of the region's population is suffering from food shortages.

Ganic, Silajdzic, Delic Hold Talks With Rose

AU2601181794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] General Michael Rose, new commander of the UN forces for Bosnia-Herzegovina, today talked with Presidency Member Ejup Ganic, Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, and Army General Rasim Delic. Here is a report by Nedzad Leko:

[Begin recording] [Leko] General Michael Rose was first received by Presidency Member Ejup Ganic. After the talks, Dr. Ganic told foreign and domestic journalists the following:

[Ganic in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] Speaking on behalf of the Presidency, I informed General Rose that we are going to do everything with a view to helping his mission here. Everybody knows that the humanitarian situation is very tragic and we hope that the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] troops headed by the general will act efficiently, protect the humanitarian convoys, and deliver food to the population, and we ourselves are going to do everything to help. We do not want UN troops to be treated badly and are encouraging Gen. Rose to act efficiently and do everything necessary.

We also touched upon other issues such as Tuzla Airport and other details. Of course, peace negotiations were one of the topics and we stressed that if clear political principles for negotiations are not formulated, Geneva will continue being a mere media zoo. Therefore, we hope that the clear political principles that were defined at the London conference will be confirmed in order for us to be able to continue political talks.

[Leko] Gen. Rose commented very briefly on the talks he had with Dr. Ganic:

[Rose in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] We had a very useful conversation. We initiated a large number of issues. I told Dr. Ganic that UNPROFOR will do the best it can with a view to continuing to help the delivery of humanitarian aid and to help the peace process in this country.

[Leko] One of the questions for Gen. Rose was whether one can expect some change in the UNPROFOR mandate with his arrival.

[Rose in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] I do not think that we are going to see any changes in the mandate I received in the near future.

[Leko] Today, Gen. Rose also talked with Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and with Hasan Muratovic, chairman of the State Commission for Relations with the United Nations. After the formal part of Gen. Rose's visit, Dr. Silajdzic told the journalist the following:

[Silajdzic] I will say only one thing: The most important thing is the humanitarian convoys, that is, how are we to clear the corridors for humanitarian convoys. I think that this is the key question and we are going to talk about it now. Everything else is of marginal importance at this moment. Therefore, freeing corridors for humanitarian convoys is the basic thing we are talking about. We are now going to continue the talks.

[Leko] In reply to the question asked by foreign journalists on whether he expects essential changes in UNPROFOR activity with Gen. Rose's arrival, Dr. Silajdzic said the following:

[Silajdzic in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] As far as I can understand, the mandate has not changed and unfortunately, as much as they would like to help, they do not have the mandate to do so. Therefore the problem is that the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina is taken for granted. We are just the other side in the conflict. The victim and aggressor are equal. The killed and the killer are the same. Why? Because nobody wants to interfere. The West has become a group of noninterfering countries. Democracy and morality are attacked in Bosnia, if that means anything to anybody. Our principles are attacked and we are seen only as a side in a conflict. The guns around Sarajevo and civilians waiting to be shelled are seen as one and the same thing. I think I have said enough.

[Leko] Would you like to see the roads for the passage of convoys freed by military action, foreign journalists asked Dr. Silajdzic.

[Silajdzic in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] We would like to see convoys pass because people are hungry, people are dying, while some other people are blocking the convoys' passage. Therefore, whoever is blocking convoys—be it Bosnians, Serbs, or Croats—should be attacked because they are killing people with starvation.

[Leko] During their meeting today, Army General Rasim Delic informed Gen. Rose about the situation on the battlefield, the humanitarian situation, and the cause of the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The two generals also talked about the problems of implementing the agreements signed so far, as well as resolutions that have been adopted without instruments for their implementation being developed.

Gen. Rose presented the aim of his mission, as well as activities he is planning for the coming period. I want to

help the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in the delivery of humanitarian aid. In doing so I will do everything with the means and forces I have at my disposal, Gen. Rose stressed at the end of today's talks. [end recording]

Warring Sides Discuss Humanitarian, Military Issues

Srpska Official Comments

LD2601235794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2341 GMT 26 Jan 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Sarajevo, Jan 26 (TANJUG)—Bosnia-Herzegovina's warring Moslems, Serbs and Croats signed late on Wednesday a declaration undertaking to protect the power facilities in this war-torn former Yugoslav Republic.

Bosnian Serb Vice-President Nikola Koljevic told reporters after the first round of talks at Sarajevo Airport that the document regulated all power disruptions in territories controlled by all three sides.

The talks at Sarajevo Airport are part of an effort to rebuild confidence among Bosnia's warring nations.

No agreement has been reached on another major issue—the release of five Serb doctors and three nurses arrested by the Moslems in Sarajevo last week in an alleged attempt to flee a Moslem-controlled quarter of the city.

"This issue should demonstrate the good will of the (Moslem) side, and we regret to say that we shall be unable to accept any agreement until this major issue has been resolved," said Koljevic.

General Milan Gvero, assistant commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, said the Moslem military authorities had been asked to publicly withdraw their declaration of war on the Serbs in these lands and to clearly call off all military operations, as insistence on confidence-building is senseless if combat operations continue.

Silajdzic Comments

AU2601211794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] A new meeting of the Group for Restoring Mutual Confidence, which consists of representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and the Serbian and Croatian sides, was held at Sarajevo airport today. After our delegation returned from the meeting, Emir Brackovic interviewed Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Begin recording] [Brackovic] Prime Minister, in your statement yesterday you, in a way, announced today's meeting of the Group for Restoring Mutual Confidence. This is a new group, a new form of attempting [words indistinct] in a way.

[Silajdzic] Yes, this group had a meeting today. The meeting lasted for somewhat shorter time today. Mr. Akmadzic also attended today's meeting. The meeting dealt with two groups of topics. They were military and humanitarian topics. Regarding military topics, those touched upon were direct telephone lines and (?something) was agreed upon—soldiers will (?certainly) be able to tell it better: meetings, regular meetings of commanders, joint military commissions. Then we went over to humanitarian issues, that is, the issue of convoys and the issue of electricity. Regarding electrical power, we drafted and signed an agreement by which the sides oblige themselves firstly that they will not destroy power lines, that they will in no way hamper the flow of electricity, as well as that the repair of and resumption of work on the following lines will be undertaken urgently: Jablanica-Kakanj, Travnik-Novi Travnik-Nova Bila, Visegrad-Gorazde-Foca, as well as Lepenica, Visegrad-Zvornik, and finally the powerline near (?Zepce). Therefore, these are the six lines that should be repaired as soon as possible. There is also the repair that had been agreed upon, but which has failed five times—that along the line of Buca Potok-Reljevo, that is, at Perivoj. We agreed upon this today, firmly agreed that the repair of that part should begin immediately. Here, this is a concrete result.

[Brackovic] Is the group going to meet again before 10 February?

[Silajdzic] It should meet on 5 February, but we shall see at what level.

[Brackovic] Is the Croatian side included in all these commissions and groups for humanitarian issues?

[Silajdzic] All right, you are obviously well informed. Yes, the Croatian side is now also included in the commissions working on humanitarian issues, the issues of cooperation regarding electricity, gas and so on. So far it was not included, but as of now it will be.

[Brackovic] Have you had bilateral meetings with [word indistinct] the Croatian side and can you [words indistinct]?

[Silajdzic] There were bilateral meetings with both sides. These were mostly political talks about which I can say that they were not particularly productive. Regarding these issues, we are obviously turning around in a circle and we are obviously not going to get out of it in this way, even though all the sides had good intentions. What is involved are simply different political options, different military options, so that there is no result. This does not mean that one should not talk and, for that very reason, we are talking.

[Brackovic] Thank you very much.

[Silajdzic] Not at all.

'Inter-Chetnik' Clashes Increase Near Brcko

AU2701095594

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 27 January carries in its regular 10-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in the republic.

Hajrudin Sermic reports from Maglaj that "one of the heaviest days of war is behind the people of Maglaj, at least in terms of the number of shells fired at the positions of the fighters of the 201st Brigade and the villages on the free territory. Three tank and infantry attacks were repelled in the Pazaric, Sedra, and (Rovin) area along the newly established defense positions, even though the chetniks and the ustasha fired over 2,000 shells from their rich arsenal. However, the fighters of the 201st Chivalrous Brigade again demonstrated heroism, morale, and patriotism, and repulsed all the attacks." The report says that "in order to justify the great losses in his ranks, and to reduce at least to some extent the panic felt by his fighters and the people of Zepa, Lozancic, commander of the treacherous 111th HVO Zepa Brigade, has been deceiving the public on Croatian Radio by claiming that they have captured some point or another. But that is a lie as his fighters have not advanced a single millimeter, nor will they. They can only move backward."

Reporting from Brcko, Hamiz Deronjic says that "the attacks on the free Brcko territory are not letting up. After futile attempts yesterday at infiltrating sabotage groups in white camouflage uniforms behind our lines, the [Serb] enemy intensified the shelling of the Brcko defense lines and the civilian targets inside the free territory. Vranovaca was again exposed to the heaviest artillery attacks. This stronghold near Brcko, which was of extreme strategic importance even in World War II, is one of the main targets of the Serbian aggressor in this offensive. Last night Vranovaca was pounded with howitzers, tanks, 60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-mm mortars, Praga, and Bofors guns." The report says that "at the same time the aggressor was bringing in reinforcements to Lipovac, Donja Brka, and Cadjavac. The large forces that the aggressor has amassed on the Brcko front do not seem to be having the least effect on the low morale of the chetniks. Interchetnik clashes have been escalating into armed conflicts with increasing frequency. Last night at 1945 [1845 GMT] the chetniks from Stari Brod and Donja Brka fired at each other with small arms, and later even threw hand grenades at each other's positions. Last night there were also small arms fire exchanges among the chetniks in the Cadjavac region."

Describing the situation in Sarajevo, the studio announcer says that "early this morning the chetniks started an artillery barrage against the city. Howitzer shells and mortars fired from Krivoglavci landed at Point 850, Jezera, and Vis. From the direction of Okruglica four howitzer shells were fired at the Jewish cemetery, while a howitzer from Metalka fired at Kobilja Glava. At just after 0700 the aggressor in Nedzarici fired mortars at Dobrinja, and artillery shells fired from Gavrica Brdo landed on Donji Kotorac and Butmir."

Fighting Near Maglaj, Sarajevo Reported

AU2601164994

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1400 GMT on 26 January within its regular 30-minute newscast carries several reports on the fighting in the republic.

Hajrudin Sermic reports from the Maglaj Commune Press Center on the "fierce chetnik and ustasha tank and infantry attacks that begun early this morning and gained in intensity and ferocity at about 1100 [1000 GMT]. More than 1,500 projectiles from tanks, howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, guns, and mortars of all kinds and calibers have been launched thus far on our defenders' positions with the support of Praga weapons and antiaircraft machine-guns and antiaircraft guns. Fire from more than 60 heavy and armored weapons was opened from all directions: Teslic, Doboj, Ozren, and Zepce." Finally, Sermic adds that "as I report, strong artillery preparation for the third breakthrough attempt is going on."

Smail Terzic reports from the 7-South Operation Group zone that "civilian targets have been shelled in the districts of Mrkotic, Kalosevic, [word indistinct], and Jelovci. The shelling has been going on for several hours."

Studio announcer Milorad Filoni reads a report by the 1st Corps Information Service according to which "on the Sarajevo battlefield, the shelling of defense lines and the city itself continued in the early afternoon hours. Mortar bombs were falling in the region of Stupsko Brdo and Bosut and shells launched from Nedjarici were falling on Dobrinja." Finally, Filoni says that "about 1345, chetniks from Paljevi and Krivoglavci launched a fierce artillery attack at the general region of Zuc."

Croats Report 'Vicious' Muslim Attacks

LD2601213494 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Excerpt] After launching a vicious attack this morning from the direction of Maglaj against positions held by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] in the area of Lijesnica and Cehajic, the Muslim army mounted a combined artillery and infantry assault in the area of Dolina from the direction of Zavidovici.

After three hours of ferocious fighting, members of the (Marko Praljic) battalion managed to disperse the enemy army. Three Muslim soldiers, including one Iranian mojahid, were killed on this occasion and their bodies have remained on the territory controlled by the HVO. A considerable quantity of arms was captured as well.

At noon the Muslims began an attack in the region of Brezova Kosa and Krsic from the direction of Zeljezno

Polje in the western sector of the Zepce front. The fighting is still under way and the defenders are repelling all the aggressor's attacks.

The most difficult situation today is on the Maglaj front. After repulsing an attempted infantry spearhead into Croat villages in the Bosna river valley near Maglaj, members of the Zepce brigade launched a counterattack and succeeded in taking a very important strategic point from which their firepower can control access to the Natronka factory where the Muslims have been manufacturing arms for quite some time now. [passage omitted]

Muslims Intensify Attacks on Bosnian Serbs

LD2601163294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1604 GMT 26 Jan 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Bratunac, Jan 26 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Moslem troops continued and intensified on Wednesday attacks in several directions on the positions and settlements of Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Serb Republic army sources reported.

According to the same sources, Moslem forces fired from infantry arms, grenade launchars, snipers and mortars on the Serbian districts of Sarajevo—Grbavica, Dobrinja one and Dobrinja four, Lukavica, Nedjarice, Ilidza, Vogosca and Rajlovac.

It is further said that Moslems have renewed attacks on the Serbian settlement of Zlatiste near Sarajevo, trying to cut off traffic between Sarajevo and Pale, the political and military headquarters of Bosnian Serbs in the vicinity of the capital city of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Intensified Moslem attacks have also been registered in the region of Doboj, Ozren, Maglaj and Zavidovici, while Moslem armed provocations persisted near the Teslic, Vlasic, Gradac and Trebava battlefields (central Bosnia-Herzegovina).

There is no peace either in the region of Gorazde, a Moslem enclave in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina which has been under U.N. protection, where Moslem forces persist with their attacks on neighbouring Serbian towns of Foca, Cajnice and Ustikolina.

Moslem units in the region of Kladanj and Kalesija, in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, also continued their artillery-infantry operations against the Serbian side, Bosnian Serb sources said.

ΩDecision on Bosanska Posavina Autonomy Viewed

94P20276A

[Editorial Report] The 4 January issue of the Zagreb weekly DANAS in Serbo-Croatian publishes on pages 22-24 an article on the founding of Bosanska Posavina. DANAS states that the local Croats established the province despite the opposition of the Herceg-Bosna leadership. The weekly explains that the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which called for only a small portion of Bosanska Posavina to be given to the Bosnian Croat republic, was the greatest motive for the establishment of Bosanska Posavina's autonomy. Every Bosanska Posavina resident will agree with this, DANAS states, adding that in comparison to the Vance-Owen plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan "was the sheer destruction of one of the most compact Croatian territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina." In contrast to the Vance-Owen plan, which called for the Bosanski Brod, Odzak, Bosanski Samac, and Orasje municipalities, as well as parts of the Derventa, Doboj, Modrica, Gradacac, and Brcko municipalities, to be included in the Croatian-majority province, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan gave the Croats only two-and-one-half municipalities, DANAS observes. This is why the Posavina residents decided at a general assembly recently held in Slavonski Brod to "return to a kind of Vance-Owen plan." The assembly made the decision to establish the province of Bosanska Posavina incorporating the municipalities of Bosanski Brod, Bosanski Samac, Derventa, Modrica, Odzak, and Orasje and parts of Brcko, Doboj, and Gradacac. According to the 1991 census, Croats were a majority in this region, with 59.6 percent of the population, followed by Serbs with 20.5 percent and Muslims with 15.5 percent. Other nationalities made up 4.4 percent of the population. "Now that the plan for the union of Posavina municipalities into a special territorial-political body has become a reality, its supporters are not pleased to be compared to Fikret Abdic," DANAS states, adding that the reason for this is not because the founding of their province is different from that of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, but because they do not want to be viewed as the creators of a conflict among the Croatian people similar to the intra-Muslim conflict in the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. The essential difference between the two is that the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia has hostile relations with the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo, while Bosanska Posavina intends to maintain equally good relations with Alija Izetbegovic and Mate Boban, DANAS concludes.

U.S. Ambassador Visits UN Sector North

LD2701095294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 0903 GMT 27 Jan 94

[Text] The American ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, visited Topusko, Petrova Gora, and Glina in UN Sector North yesterday. A report from the American Embassy in Zagreb says that Mr. Galbraith wished to find out about the situation in that part of Croatian territory under UN protection. Mr. Galbraith described the visit as successful and said that it was important to start communicating.

Jarcevic on Strengthening RSK Government

AU2601181994 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1611 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Interview with Slobodan Jarcevic, foreign minister of the republic of Serb Krajina, by unidentified correspondent in Belgrade—live]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] Good day, or better to say, good evening!

[Jarcevic] Good evening! [passage omitted]

[Reporter] To return to the Serbian-Croatian normalization agreement, a document that only expresses a will and desire to normalize the relations, and constitutes no treaty or anything similar. You have already spoken a bit about this document, finding in it your place as an independent country that will, in a certain historic moment, decide where and with whom it wants to live, observing the political will of the people to the greatest possible extent. Therefore, how do you perceive what is being called the interpretation of this document, the interpretation venturing into the sphere of mutual recognition and the establishment of economic and transportation links.

[Jarcevic] The interpretation of this agreement coming from Zagreb should worry us. However, we are used to this as the Croats never speak about the events and their relations with the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] and other countries realistically. They always express their wishes and many people have noticed that this is only a dream of the Croatian politicians.

[Reporter] However, I was listening to television last night, I cannot recall exactly which channel it was, to a man who, as I understood it, is envisaged to be the chief of the Croatian bureau in Belgrade, who was stating precisely that the Serbs and the Croats have had enough of mourning clothes and ruins and spoke very calmly, I would say, without any aggravation or stubbornness, or any dwelling on those well-known stories about bits of territories of this or another country.

[Jarcevic] Mr. Markovic is right when he says that both sides have had enough of war, bloodshed, destruction, and the decreasing standard of living on both sides. He is right, and I have nothing to add here. However, Mr. Markovic, if he represents the government in Zagreb, could have eliminated all this a few months earlier, in February 1993, when a RSK delegation offered Croatia the establishment of transport, railroad, and postal links, the use of oil pipelines, and everything else that is in the interests of the Republic of Croatia. Without this it cannot consolidate itself and get its economy and its society back on their feet. What is preventing the Croats from accomplishing all these goals is an agreement that they must sign with the RSK representatives. [passage omitted]

The Croats have rejected signing any sort of agreement in this sense with the RSK government as everybody would know that this would mean a signature between two countries. Croatia was in a dilemma whether to recognize us or not. It has decided not to recognize us and not to sign any agreements, hoping to now sign such agreements with the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. However, this is illusionary. Croatia will sign with the FRY only the agreements that regard the territory, the economy, and all the rest, of the FRY. Everything that should be regulated on the RSK territory, Croatia must anyway sign with the RSK government. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Mr. Jarcevic, you are a member of the present RSK government. The presidential elections have just ended. It is well known that this post went to Milan Martic. Regarding the events relating to the constitution of the assembly, can you briefly tell us when the constituting session of the assembly, the election of the government, and everything else are envisaged?

[Jarcevic] I believe that the assembly will convene next week already and that the new president, Mr. Milan Martic, will entrust the mandate to one of the politicians who originates from the RSK. It is certain that the reconstruction of the government will take place. It is impossible for it to remain in its present makeup, because the president has announced that he would employ more people in the state administration for it to be more efficient. Namely, what has hindered the RSK's development was precisely the lack of efficient administration. You know that the Republic of Croatia has inherited almost the entire state administration and other institutions on the RSK territory, for example, there was not a single archive center. This means that, for decades, the Croatian leaders in the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] have been deliberately taking away from the Serbian ethnic territories anything that resembled an attribute of a state.

[Reporter] Therefore, it will be a major task to put all this in order?

[Jarcevic] There will be a lot of work and I think that President Martic intends to invite numerous cadres who have sought refuge in the FRY into the administration, economy, police, and the army.

[Reporter] Thank you very much.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Visits

Meets With Tudjman

LD2601221894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman received Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko this evening. Minister Zlenko conveyed to President Tudjman greetings from Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk as well as Kravchuk's message that Ukraine attaches special importance to good neighborly relations between Ukraine and Croatia.

President Tudjman stressed Ukraine's considerable contribution to efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the UN Protected Areas, particularly with help from the Ukrainian battalion serving with the UNPROFOR.

Successful cooperation with the UN and the CSCE, as well as Ukraine's support—on the diplomatic field—for efforts aimed at a peaceful settlement of the situation in former Yugoslavia, were said to be of particular importance for both countries. Both sides reached the conclusion that all the prerequisites exist for a successful development of political, economic, cultural, sporting, and other relations.

Meets With Valentic

LD2601222694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic also received Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko. The Croatian prime minister briefed the Ukrainian foreign minister on the situation in the country, stressing that it was dependent on the war in Bosnia- Herzegovina and the general crisis in this region. Laying emphasis on Croatia's desire for peace, Valentic called on Ukraine—as a respectable European country—to help [Croatia] in its search for a way out of the crisis.

Meets With Granic

LD2601230694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] Talks ended in Zagreb this evening between the Croatian and Ukrainian foreign ministers, Mate Granic and Anatoliy Zlenko. After the talks the two ministers held a news conference. In a brief statement the Ukrainian minister said, among other things:

[Begin Zlenko recording, in Ukrainian with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] The main result of our visit to Croatia is the fact that after discussing issues of mutual interest, we achieved near identity of views on numerous problems. We also agreed on the main guidelines concerning the development of our relations and on a need to resolve some concrete issues. Apart from this we agreed on a legal framework for ways of resolving these issues, and decided what we could start working on in the near future. Interstate expert groups will meet to try and resolve certain issues.

However, and this is most important, we are all convinced that the Croatian people view the Ukrainian people with sympathy and this forms a basis for the future comprehensive development of cooperation between the two countries.

Our future concrete tasks include the preparation and signing, very shortly, of an agreement on friendly cooperation, expected to take place at the time of Premier Granic's visit to Kiev. We also agreed—because of a failure to implement the agreement on trade cooperation signed three years ago—to prepare another such document with more realistic objectives. We hope that this is already a substantial progress in our relations. [end recording]

In his statement Croatian Minister Mate Granic stressed the following:

[Begin Granic recording] It is perhaps worth saying that Croatia and Ukraine have no open questions and that political relations and goodwill are at present way above economic cooperation. It is clear that both countries are preoccupied with their own problems. For Croatia, the most important question at present is the reintegration of the occupied territories in the legal system of Croatia. Ukraine is more preoccupied with economic issues. I believe, however, that we will achieve a more substantial development of economic relations, for which we have realistic chances. [end recording]

Signs Protocols

LD2601175094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Croatian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mate Granic and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko signed a protocol in Zagreb today on cooperation between the Croatian and Ukrainian ministries of foreign affairs and a protocol on establishing consular relations.

We are new independent states and therefore we have mutual interests in many spheres. We would primarily wish to develop political cooperation, but also economic cooperation, as we have good conditions for this, Ukrainian Minister Anatoliy Zlenko stated following the signing of the documents.

We had talks on the political situation in the region, the situation in Croatia and Ukraine, the promotion of economic relations which lag behind the political will, and on political relations, because there are no open questions between Ukraine and Croatia, Mate Granic stated. He announced that treaties on friendship and cooperation between the two states, treaties on economic, cultural, medical, and transport cooperation, and several other important documents are being prepared.

The Croatian minister informed journalists that his talks with the Ukrainian minister also referred to all important issues in Croatian and Ukrainian foreign policy. Minister Granic also informed the Ukrainian minister about the Geneva negotiations, his visit to Italy in February, and Croatia's desire to be admitted to the Council of Europe and to join the Partnership for Peace program.

Granic Letter to Kinkel on Refugee Problem

LD2601224494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 2203 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Mr. Granic sent a letter to the German Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, following Germany's decision to repatriate Croat refugees in Germany starting from the 30 April of this year.

The Croatian foreign minister thanked Germany for its efforts in caring for thousands of Croat refugees but pointed out that one-third of Croatia's territory was still under occupation so that most of the refugees cannot return to their homes.

In his letter Mr. Granic called on Germany to help in the return of refugees to their homes but urged it to keep in mind that this process should be carried out in phases in accordance with the normalization of relations and the reintegration of the UN-protected areas into Croatia's legal system.

Herceg-Bosna Reports Capture of Krsice Heights

LD2601151194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The political department of the Herceg-Bosna Defense Ministry has reported that the Croatian Defense Council has captured the important Krsice heights in the Uskoplje area. According to the same source the Muslim army is amassing troops in the Donja Slatina area between Jablanica and Prozor. [passage omitted]

British Ship Commander To Be Prosecuted

LD2501180794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] All the necessary paperwork has been completed by the customs office of the port of Split for the initiation of criminal proceedings against David Gerard, the commander of the British warship Sir Geraint caught violating customs regulations yesterday. Rodoljub Jovic reporting for Croatian Radio from Split.

The illegal container carrying undeclared ammunition, explosives, and other military equipment instead of 6,950 kilograms of petrol and gas has been stored at the Split customs warehouse. The head of the customs office of the port of Split, Rade Roso, has completed all the administrative formalities and has forwarded all the relevant documents to the commander of the British warship through the mediation of an official agent. He has also filled out a customs violation report and has submitted it to the judiciary.

According to initial estimates, the value of the undeclared cargo is 1 billion 230 million Croatian dinars and the penalty for such activities is a fine and the compulsory confiscation of the cargo.

In reference to yesterday's statement by the spokeswoman for the British peacekeepers, Rade Roso repeated today that the ship's commander had behaved strangely during the routine inspection of the container in question. Namely, the above-mentioned container was opened forcibly because the key had allegedly been lost and the excuse for this did not strike us as plausible because it was given after the violation had been discovered and after the real cargo list had been found locked up in the container.

Federal

Hungarian Foreign Minister Arrives on Visit

LD2701145694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1410 GMT 27 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 27 January (TANJUG)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky arrived in Belgrade this afternoon on board a special flight from Budapest. He is paying a two-day official visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the invitation of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic who welcomed him at Surcin airport.

Immediately upon Jeszenszky's arrival, the two foreign ministers began official talks on important issues of mutual interest in the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [passage omitted]

The Hungarian foreign minister is expected to be received by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today.

Talks with FRY President Zoran Lilic, Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, and Vladislav Jovanovic are scheduled to take place tomorrow.

Hopes for Improved Relations

LD2701154794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1443 GMT 27 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, 27 January (TANJUG)—The foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Hungary, Vladislav Jovanovic and Geza Jeszensky, today spoke in favor of resuming contacts and good-neighborly cooperation.

"I have always valued goodneighborly relations. I hope that despite the current situation it will be possible to improve Yugoslav-Hungarian relations," Geza Jeszensky said at Belgrade airport upon his arrival from Budapest at the start of a two-day official visit to the FRY.

The Hungarian foreign minister said that conditions for cooperation had changed over the last few years but went on to express hope that there was scope for improving relations, especially in the humanitarian sphere, despite changed circumstances. In this context he described Vojvodina Hungarians as a "bridge for cooperation" and said that there was an opportunity currently for them to remain so.

Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic said that he expected good results in Yugoslav-Hungarian talks but noted that it remained to be seen what could be objectively achieved. He added that now was the right moment to renew talks and contacts.

Serbia

SPS Nominates Candidate for Assembly Chairman

AU2601152994 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Excerpt] The Serbian assembly has been holding a consultative session for three days and yet the chairman of the assembly has not been elected, not even in the morning part of the session. The assembly is currently in recess until 1600 [1500 GMT] so that the heads of the deputy caucuses can reach an agreement. Srdjan Savic reports:

[Savic] At the beginning of the session, chairman Vojislav Dimitrijevic told deputies that he had received a new nomination only from the Socialist Party of Serbia for the post of the chairman of the assembly. The party's new candidate is Dragan Tomic, head of the party's deputy caucus.

Vuk Draskovic, president of the Serbian Renewal Movement, explained why DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] had not proposed its new candidate today. He said that the parliament's left and right parties' attempts to outvote one another were in vain, and that it was necessary to reach a political agreement on the division of responsibility for the legislative, executive, and judiciary authorities. The Socialists bear the greatest responsible for all compromises and agreements, because they are the first party on the political ladder, Draskovic said. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Serb Court To Begin Trial of Ethnic Albanians

AU2601192494 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] The Serbian Court of Prishtina District is expected to begin the trial of 19 Albanians who are charged with allegedly creating the organizations "National Movement for the Republic of Kosova" and "National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova." They are also charged with hostile activity in infringing the territorial integrity.

The trial has been postponed four times so far. Such trials, more of which are expected to be trumped-up in the future, aim to frighten Albanians and encourage them to leave Kosova.

Vojvodina

Ethnic Hungarian Leader on Aid, Autonomy

AU2601154494 Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 26 Jan 94 p 9

[Interview with Janos Vekas, deputy chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina, by Geza Mucsi; place and date not given: "Janos Vekas on Aid to Vojvodina"]

[Text] *Hungary intensively aids Vojvodina. Apparently, problems do exist; Janos Vekas will speak about these.*

[Vekas] We are trying to function in the Vojvodina Hungarian community as if the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMDK] and the VMDK-member local government deputies formed some kind of national minority parliament. Even now, this body can be said to be pluralist: It includes everyone from the Christian democrats to the social democrats, even the socialists (but not socialists like the ones sitting in the Serbian Parliament), and the various ideological platforms. We have many differences, but we are held together by one fact, namely that we want autonomy. The VMDK's national board can be seen as an executive body, and we feel that our mandate obliges us to deal with all issues affecting the situation of the Vojvodina Hungarians. This is the reason we established the operative organizations that can fulfill certain tasks, and this is how the Vox Humana was established. Naturally, this organization deals with humanitarian aid. At the moment, this is the only reliable organization. However, we think that problems are arising that affect both the professional and the political aspects of aid. We would like to find out what proportion of the aid that is collected under the heading of helping the Vojvodina Hungarians actually reaches them.

[Mucsi] What about international aid?

[Vekas] We do not receive anything from the big international aid organizations. The distribution of this aid is largely done against us, regardless of what the intent of the international aid organizations is. The European Union [EU] clearly intends the aid for the refugees and for those families who host or support refugees. What happens in practice is that, for example in Temerin, the Hungarians can see the Serbs line up at the town hall and take away the bacon. Hungarians in Vojvodina are in a very delicate situation. If they, for example the Hungarians in Zenta [Senta], conditionally accept that they are hosting so-called refugees, then they can get EU-aid, but this also means forced settlement in the Vojvodina, or they exclude themselves from the aid. We have told this to European leaders.

[Mucsi] What was the reaction to this?

[Vekas] We did not get a direct and clear answer to this question. We collect what we can in the West through our own resources, but this is of course negligible compared to the big international aid services. However, in Hungary, parcels are usually collected to help the Hungarians in Vojvodina, or, as it were, to help the Vojvodina.

[Mucsi] This is of course different....

[Vekas] We are convinced that people in Hungary generally think of the Hungarians in Vojvodina, however, the Hungarians receive very little from these packages. We would like to clarify this issue. What we can do is that, if we receive adequate information on the collections in Hungary, and it is clearly shown to whom, for what purpose, and where the aid is intended, then we can say whether the consignment has arrived at its destination. Naturally, everyone has the right to decide whom he wants to help, and for what purpose he gives the aid—in this sense, we do not wish to prevent anyone from aiding, for example, the Bosnian Serbs. However, in our view, it is dishonest to forward the aid that is collected specifically for the Vojvodina Hungarians to some other destination.

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